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ABSTRACT 
 
The South African policy for peace missions is found in the 1999 “White Paper on South 
African Participation in International Peace Missions” of the Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation
1. The White Paper adopts a comprehensive approach for the 
creation of peace in conflict and post conflict societies. The comprehensive approach 
includes the employment of military and civilian actors. Activities of these actors are 
determined by the nature of the peace mission which includes preventative diplomacy, 
peace making, peace building, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance and 
humanitarian intervention. The policy further promotes the strategy of South African 
actors addressing the underlying causes of conflict instead of symptoms. 
The research seeks to investigate whether or not South African institutions implement 
the civilian peacebuilding aspect of the policy and adopts the use of the Burundi peace 
mission (2000-2008) as a case study. Qualitative research, which includes the use of 
document research and personal interviews, is the adopted research methodology.  
Through application of the variables of the 5-C protocol (coalitions and clients, 
commitment, capacity, context and content) the research established several 
implementation challenges. The research also utilised the 5-C protocol variables for 
recommendations on possible reforms. 
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 Chapter 1: Conceptualisation 1
 
 Introduction  1.1
 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the conceptualisation of the study. It identifies the 
research - problem statement, objectives, questions, proposition, and field of study, 
regulatory framework, limitations, methodology and conceptual framework. The 
subsequent chapters address issues in the following manner: Chapter 2 discusses 
national and international peacebuilding institutions. Nationally, the chapter explores 
South Africa’s “White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace 
Missions”. The white paper is used to explore the peacebuilding architecture and how 
institutions found therein affect implementation of civilian peacebuilding activities. 
Internationally, the chapter investigates peacebuilding institutions at regional and 
international levels and also their effect on implementation of the white paper. The 
exercise reveals a complexity of institutions and actors informed by different interests 
and motives and their pursuit of different agendas. Chapter 3 provides insight on the 
Burundi case study. The chapter explains how context, historical and regional, 
introduced different dynamics to the peace process and peacebuilding in that country. 
The chapter focuses on the actors involved in the Burundi peace process and therefore 
discusses issues of conflict and processes found in peacebuilding missions. The 
chapter also identifies the root causes of the conflict and identifies appropriate activities 
that should have been adopted to ensure the creation of durable peace in Burundi. 
Chapter 4 focuses on data presentation, interpretation and possible recommendations. 
Chapter 5 provides a summary and recommendations on suggested policy and 
institutional reforms.  
 
 Problem Statement 1.1.1
The “White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions” 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999), hereinafter referred to as “the policy,” views 
comprehensive peace missions as vital for the creation of peace in conflict ridden 
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countries (Malan & Kent, 2003, p. 1). According to the policy, actors and their activities 
differ in missions of “preventative diplomacy”, “peace making”, “peace building”, “peace 
enforcement”, “humanitarian assistance” and “humanitarian intervention” (1999, p. 7). 
The policy adopts the stance that actors should address the underlying causes of 
conflict instead of symptoms, and cautions that failure to do so results in the recurrence 
of conflict (1999, p. 19). It then identifies peace mission actors as being inclusive of both 
civilian and military personnel (1999, p. 9) and supports the view that “civilians are a 
crucial component of any contemporary peace mission” (1999, p. 23).  
Landsberg (n.d, p. 20), in a paper prepared for South Africa’s (SA) fifteen year review 
process, and inter alia, informed by SA Foreign Affairs 2007/2008 strategic document, 
states that “No other state in the continent has played such a pivotal role in post-conflict 
peace-building and development”. The policy’s prescripts and these assertions add to 
the policy gap and problem statement as research literature indicates that policy 
implementation and research on SA civilian peacebuilding activities is limited. These 
observations have been developed by a study of the following; 
a. Research institutions, scholars and Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation (DIRCO) activities have mainly focused on aspects of “preventative 
diplomacy, peace-making and peace-enforcement” (ACCORD, 2007; Ayebari, n.d; 
Ameir, 2008; Dlomo, 2010). 
b. Serwer and Thomson (2007, pp. 369-370) note that the lack of civilian inclusion in 
peace missions is an international oversight, and that some countries2 have recently 
undertaken initiatives to improve the status quo by “beefing up their civilian 
capacities”. 
c. Paudel (2009) describes research on policy implementation as insufficient and calls 
for a revival of interest. He also notes that scholars in the field have focused their 
attention on policy implementation on sectors of “education, health, environment, 
social and economic policy” resulting in studies on implementation of foreign policy 
being “conspicuously rare -1-2 per cent of all publications” (2009, p. 48). 
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 Research Objectives 1.1.2
“costs of security policy failures … [are] deadly” (Brown, 2007, p. 47) 
 
The main purpose of this research is to provide policy decision makers and actors in the 
field of peace and security with knowledge and meaning on current debates around the 
research question in order to prevent these deadly costs. The study also aims to 
investigate and, if necessary, suggest additional reforms on the existing peacebuilding 
institutional arrangement, the policy and its implementation. 
Exploratory and descriptive research is used to interpret and determine questions of 
“what”, “how” and “who” in relation to understanding the causes of the conflict, 
peacebuilding tools and peacebuilding activities. 
 
 Research Questions  1.1.3
The primary research question is: did SA implement the civilian peacebuilding 
objectives of the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace 
Missions (the policy) in the Burundi peace mission during the period of 2000-2008? 
Supplementary questions attend to; 
a. How did civilian activities, by SA intervening actors, address the root causes of the 
conflict? 
b. How did peacebuilding institutions facilitate or impede the participation of civilians 
in peacebuilding activities? 
c. What, if any, are the suggested reforms? 
 
 Proposition 1.1.4
The research is premised on the proposition that peacebuilding institutions negatively 
affect outputs of civilian peacebuilding activities and the attainment of SA objectives of 
comprehensive peace missions as envisaged by the white paper on South African 
participation in international peace missions. 
15 
 
 Field of Study 1.1.5
Policy (5-C protocol) and institutional analysis is utilized to identify issues that impede or 
facilitate implementation of the policy through research on civilian peacebuilding.  
 
 Regulatory Framework  1.1.6
The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (1999), 
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1719 and General Assembly 
(GA) 7191 and the Arusha Agreement of August 20003 are the regulatory documents 
used for the study. 
 
 Limitations of Study 1.1.7
As the research is qualitative, the social context of the research question informed the 
first three limitations. Firstly, the single use of the Burundi case study is restrictive, as 
there may be different implementation results (outputs) in other peace missions. 
Secondly, the period under review is confined to peacebuilding during a certain period 
whilst policy implementation may have different results in other time periods. Thirdly, 
peacebuilding activities are confined to civilian national departments and the exclusion 
of security services may distort findings on the general South African Government’s 
implementation of the policy. Lastly, financial constraints deterred the researcher from 
conducting research in Burundi, however validation was ensured through desk top 
research and engagement with experts on the subject matter. 
 
 Research Methodology 1.2
 
Research Design 
A qualitative research design is adopted. Judgemental selection (Neuman, 2011, pp. 
241, 268) is used in the identification of experts e.g. international relations bureaucrats 
and security analysts. 
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Research Approach 
The single case study of the Burundi during 2000-2008 was adopted to interpret and 
explore the hidden complexities of peacebuilding and its implementation. According to 
Neuman (2011, p. 42), the approach is valuable as it permits use of “multiple 
viewpoints”, highlights issues of learning from experience and encourages the 
construction of new theories  
South Africa’s prominent role in the peace mission of Burundi (Malan & Kent, 2003, pp. 
5-6) and the existence of the policy during the time frame selected, informed the choice 
of case study. Whilst findings must be understood in the context of location (Burundi 
during 2000 to 2008), Neuman (2011, p. 217) notes that the approach produces results 
capable of being generalised. 
 
Research Techniques 
Interviews and documentary evidence was used for data collection and analysis. 
Opinions, experiences, views and observations informed these tools. Newman (2011, p. 
172) advises that data from these tools assist in narrowing the focus of a study. Primary 
data was sourced from interviewing persons with first-hand experience and knowledge 
of the Burundi peace process (bureaucrats and security experts). Secondary data was 
sourced from those who had studied the peacebuilding environment.  
Semi structured interactive interviews, conducted from standard open ended questions, 
were prepared before the interview (see attached questionnaire in annexures 2 and 3). 
The unambiguous questions specific to the research objectives were organised 
according to themes4 to enable future linking, consolidation and interpretation of data. 
Interactions allowed flexibility and space for clarification of viewpoints, introduction of 
new information, expression of own interpretation and elicitation of new insights. The 
first challenge in the tool lies in the prevention of interviewer and interviewee bias5. 
Validation of interviewee’s data was achieved by checking for consistency with other 
evidence collected.  
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Data Presentation and Analysis 
The chapter summarises data collected and indicates relationships or patterns between 
activities, institutions and policy implementation. The chapter also undertakes a process 
of analysis that includes defining the research issue, the division of the issue into 
different segments, narrowing the issue into manageable sub issues, evaluating the 
connection between the different parts, considering how the narrowed issues relate to 
the whole question, and finally interpreting the findings. To achieve this, Dawson’s 
(2002) and Zandamela’s (2012, p. 90) approach was followed, i.e. summaries of 
interviews attached to transcripts compiled during the interview process and analysis of 
all data was progressively revisited. Thematic and comparative analysis of all data was 
undertaken. There was cross referencing and checking of data between interviews, 
summaries, transcripts, documents and notes prepared on each subject under review.  
 
Operationalisation 
The interview questions address issues that determine the success or failure of 
implementation of the policy related to the proposition that institutions inform policy 
implementation (output). The questions are directed to unpacking the relationship 
between institutions, activities and implementation. Eight interviews were conducted 
from one DIRCO official involved in the Great Lakes region, one NOCPM member, one 
from ARF, three from other national departments and two from independent security 
experts. 
The first theme determines whether or not there was a common understanding and on 
the objective of the peacebuilding exercise, e.g. what was sought to be addressed and 
how. The second interrogates issues of the policy understanding and knowledge, e.g. 
resource bank and reasons for its successes or failure. The third focuses on bilateral 
and multilateral activities. The fourth theme relates to institutions and institutional 
arrangements and understanding on their impact on implementation of the policy. The 
5-C protocols of implementation are used in an over-arching manner to analyse the data 
and provide possible reforms. 
 
18 
 
 Concepts  1.3
 Institutions and institutional approach  1.3.1
 
Institutional studies provide valuable insight on institutions at various levels. Firstly, it 
discusses how formal and informal institutions affect the behaviour of actors by 
revealing “both the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy and the likely 
direction of that pressure”. Secondly, it provides understanding on the evolution of 
institutions (Hill, 2005, pp. 81-82). Thirdly, it provides insight on relationships between 
structure, agency and action (Hay & Winscott, 1998; Hill, 2005, p. 83) and, fourthly, an 
understanding on the distribution of power between actors. Lastly, it provides insight on 
required institutional reforms. The institutional approach is therefore a valuable tool for 
understanding institutions, providing insight on how institutional arrangements impede 
or frustrate the aims of political policy, and providing insight on reform for enhancing 
policy implementation. 
Critics note concerns about the institutional approach (Hill, 2005). The first relates to the 
wide definition of the term ‘institutions’. According to critics, this wide definition 
introduces numerous variables under one topic, e.g. norms, ideas, values. The wide 
variables are then said to impose divergent constraints on the exercise of power and 
authority. Lastly, other critics note that the approach addresses issues of change post 
facto instead of in advance and therefore insist that the concept is better used to explain 
issues of change than stability. 
The research addresses issues of peacebuilding in post conflict societies. As indicated 
later in the peacebuilding concept, these societies are characterised by weak 
institutions. It is argued that properly configured peacebuilding institutions would assist 
post conflict societies minimise the prospects of recurrence of conflicts. 
The peacebuilding institutions in the study will also provide insight into the rules and 
parameters that enable or impede interactions between actors, bestow power and 
authority and inform on how these are exercised. The institutional approach therefore 
presents an opportunity to suggest reforms and improve quality of peacebuilding 
institutions. 
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Development of the concept 
The definition of institutions is informed by different academic disciplines. Hall & Taylor 
(1996, p. 938) provide a definition of institutions as involving “formal or informal 
procedures, routine, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure 
of the polity or political economy”. The research however, for reasons discussed later, 
adopts the definition of historical institutionalism which identifies institutions as     
“Formal …, private or public … structural properties of society (or groups within them) 
which are constituted by the rules and procedures that constrain some forms of 
behaviour and interaction between people and groups and enable others in social, 
economic and political domains” (Leftwich, 2007, p. 11). External intervening actors 
form part of this definition and in relation the research refer to SA; civilian national 
Government departments, chapter nine constitutional institutions and civil society 
organisations (Orjuela, 2003) which are directly sponsored by a national Government. 
The terms excludes security services as defined in Chapter 11 of the Constitution 
(1996) i.e. defence, police services and intelligence services.  
In the development of the concept, Hall & Taylor note that political science is currently 
“informed by not one but three new institutionalisms” (1996, p. 955) introduced in 
1980’s. The three schools of thoughts are; historical, rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism. 
 
 Historical institutionalism 1.3.1.1
 
Historical institutionalism uses “historical analysis, to trace the evolution of policy over a 
long time” (Hill, 2005, p. 80) and the approach results in historical preferences and 
interests informing the adoption of current policy decisions (Thoenig, 2002). Moe (1994) 
further notes that it concerns itself with “time, culture and personality”.  
Historical institutionalism accepts conflict and scarce resources as determinants of 
political and social outcomes and that, in the presence of competing interests, the state 
acts as a non-neutral agent (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Due to viewing “public administration 
as part of political life” (Thoenig, 2002, p. 128) historical institutionalism becomes useful 
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for analysing and providing reform measures for institutions characterised by political 
competition. Their viewing of institutions as non-neutral agents is advantageous as it 
enables investigations on issues of “conflict and process” (Leftwich, 2007; Thoenig, 
2002) and therefore identifies issues of how uneven power relations affect functioning of 
different institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 938). Due to these reasons and others 
enumerated later, historical institutionalism is adopted in this study. 
 
 Rational choice institutionalism 1.3.1.2
 
Political scientists informed rational choice institutionalism. The approach is premised 
on the thinking that policy actors possess preferences and strategically apply these to 
achieve specific goals. Since the actions of actors are rational, the approach particularly 
pays “attention on the constraints imposed on rational actors” (Hay & Winscott, 1998, p. 
952). Rational choice institutionalism defines institutions according to formal rules, 
procedures or norms (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947) and views institutional existence as 
directed to “help capture gains from cooperation” (Leftwich, 2007, p. 22).  
 
 Sociological institutionalism  1.3.1.3
 
The definition of institutions by sociological institutionalism is informed by the garbage 
can theory, sociology of institutions, organisational theory, “symbol systems, cognitive 
scripts and moral templates” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947). The sociological 
institutionalism gives prominence to culture rules and behaviour of policy actors (Hill, 
2005). The relationship between individual action and institutions is considered as 
“highly-interactive and mutually-constitutive” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 948). According to 
Moe (1994, p. 20), sociological institutionalism does not attend to issues of conflict, 
does not pay attention to interests and strategies of individual actors and therefore, 
unlike political scientists, fails to answer questions of “why political actors do what they 
do”. 
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Hill notes that unlike historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism draws a 
distinction between institutions and organisations and therefore states that “the term 
organisation … refers to an expandable tool, a rational instrument engineered to do a 
job. An ‘institution’, on the other hand, is more nearly a natural product of social needs 
and pressures – a responsive adaptive organism” (2005, p. 79). Kumssa & Mbeche’s 
definition of institutions as “Governmental … and non-Governmental social systems and 
their underlying values, rules, norms of behaviour and traditions that govern social 
relations” (2004, p. 841) falls within the thinking of Hill (2005). 
 
As indicated earlier, the historical institutionalism definition is adopted in this research 
due to the considerations provided hereafter. The approach is advantageous since it 
embraces both the calcus and cultural approaches in its analysis, and, as Hay & 
Winscott state, it “represent a considerable advance on their rationalist and sociological 
antecedents” (1998, p. 954). Secondly, it pays attention to issues of time and addresses 
big substantive issues (Leftwich, 2007, p. 23). Thirdly, it includes organisations in its 
definition and views these as “instruments” and “sub-set of institutions” (Leftwich, 2007; 
Thoenig, 2002, p. 131)6. Fourthly, it pays attention to constraints and focuses the 
discussion on the fact that actors have to abide by certain rules when making decisions. 
Fifthly, its views of the state as non-neutral agent enables the discussion to contribute 
on issues of “conflict and process” (Leftwich, 2007, p. 23; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2006) and 
thus extend the argument to substantive issues instead of concentrating only on 
procedural aspects. Lastly, its conflict and process dimension also enables 
investigations on relationships between actors, institutions and the impact of uneven 
power relations. 
 
Power in institutions 
The understanding of power and decision making is critical in institutions. Power is 
studied as an outcome (Bowe, Ball, & Gold, 1992) and relates to “the ability to make 
people (or things) do what they would not otherwise have done” and denotes forms of 
“force, persuasion … coercion and manipulation” (McLean, 1996, p. 396). Authority in 
this document is confined to power that is prescribed in terms of legal instruments. 
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The study of power strives to place into context how relationships, institutions, interests, 
and different actors impact on the decision making process and its outcomes and 
adopts the elite theory view which provides room for the exploration of decision making 
being influenced by one actor “across different issue areas” (Lukes, 1993, pp. 51-52). It 
is argued that in the implementation of the SA policy (peace mission), the presidency 
and other actors possess this power and use their authority to ensure conformity from 
other national actors.  
In conclusion, in identifying institutions, Leftwich provides a framework that recognises 
institutions as “non-neutral”, “formal or informal” structures which “express ideas, 
interests, purposes and power of those who designed and supervise them and not 
(usually) those of the people who oppose them”. They are said to also “last over time” 
and are “the object of an on-going political contestation” (2007, pp. 10-11). These 
characteristics provide a picture of their role and importance in the policy environment. 
Kumssa & Mbeche (2004, p. 852) note “development problems of African countries can 
be partly attributed to the weak institutions and unresponsiveness of their administrative 
systems”. The institutional approach, whilst applicable in all political environments, is 
specifically important in weak states as it assists in addressing reforms that could 
contribute in developing measures that could create political stability and certainty, 
crucial elements in the rebuilding of weak states. 
It is also argued that, in order to attend to the complex issues of peacebuilding, the 
institutional approach provides an opportunity to suggest reforms not only on procedural 
issues but also on substantive matters of peacebuilding. Lastly, it is evident that the field 
of policy implementation is a contested political terrain between different actors and 
influences where power and authority are continuously at play (Bowe, Ball, & Gold, 
1992, p. 10). The approach therefore provides an opportunity to identify institutional 
power and interests and their effect on policy implementation. 
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 Implementation 1.3.2
 
De Coning & Cloete (2006) provide various models of policy processing. The identified 
models include those of Dunn, Muhaba et al and Wissink. Dunn’s model consists of 
agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy 
assessment (De Coning & Cloete, 2006, p. 50), whilst Muhaba et al (De Coning & 
Cloete, 2006) includes policy formulation, implementation and monitoring and 
evaluation. Wissink (De Coning & Cloete, 2006, p. 51), on the other hand, details stages 
of initiation, agenda setting, processing the issue, consideration of issues, making 
choices, publication, resource allocation, implementation, adjudication, impact 
evaluation and feedback. Whilst the models differ, they share some common features, 
including the phase of implementation. Brynard & de Coning (2006, p. 180) thereafter 
identify implementation as “one of the critical pillars” of policy management.  
Despite its importance, the concept is still ill defined and its variables still a topic for 
scholarly debate. On bringing understanding to this, Brynard & de Coning (2006) argue 
that definitions of implementation differ due to the different perspectives of different 
scholars e.g. some view it as a process, whilst others as an outcome and others as an 
output. The different perspectives influence the angle of measurement of success or 
failure of implementation. As Paudel (2009) states, scholars who view it as a process 
investigate steps and action taken to achieve directives of decision makers, whilst those 
concerned with output, interrogate the extent to which goals have been achieved and 
outcome driven perspectives relate to the abstract level of achieving “measurable 
change” attained. 
Due to these different outlooks, the various definitions include measures undertaken “to 
carry out, accomplish, fulfil, produce, complete … so as to obtain desired results”, 
measures undertaken by “public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at 
the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions”, the “conversion of 
mainly physical and financial resources into concrete service delivery outputs …. aimed 
at achieving policy objectives” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 183) and “what develops 
between the establishment of an apparent intention on the art of Government to do 
something or stop doing something and the ultimate impact …” (Paudel, 2009, p. 37). 
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 Implementation variables 1.3.3
 
Fotaki (2010) argues that implementation studies on failure or success of policies are 
also dependent on different variables influenced by different disciplines of researchers 
e.g. economics, political science, public management, or organisational theory.            
Paudel (2009) therefore notes that consequently the concept “is heavily dominated by 
many variables but lack crucial variables”. Paudel’s (2009) observation is important as it 
informs the presence of the variety of analytical outlooks on implementation. However, 
despite these differences, there is general agreement among researchers on 
categorising studies of implementation as ones concerned with “policy change”       
(Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 89).  
Spillane et al (2002) also add that there is general agreement amongst researchers that 
the concept of implementation includes the existence of a relationship between agent 
and principal where the principal (decision makers) requires assistance of the agent to 
ensure the carrying out of the decision. The argument presented is that fault lines of 
implementation are found within this relationship. The common faults usually identified 
by scholars are ones relating to; ambiguity of policies which result in the agent being 
unable to interpret and decipher the authoritative decision, institutional and 
organisational arrangements that affect “structure principal-agent relations”, 
unwillingness or incapacity of agent to carry out tasks and sense-making which relates 
to the interpretive nature of the agent and influences that affect that interpretation. e.g. 
prior knowledge.  
The development of the concept, through three generations, provides insight on how 
different variables and understanding of the concept emanated and informed 
implementation research.  
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 First generation studies (1970’s – 80’s) 1.3.3.1
 
Prior to the 1970’s, research on the topic was scattered under various topics            
(Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 89). Pressman and Wildasky have been identified by scholars 
as renewing interest on the subject matter in the 1970’s (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 
183; Paudel, 2009, p. 36) and are referred to as the first generation researchers. 
This generation viewed policy implementation in a rational, linear, top down and 
administrative manner where implementation systems were “highly rationalised, 
legalistic, authoritarian and hierarchical” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 185). The 
generation focused on how single authoritative decisions were carried out at single or 
multiple places (Paudel, 2009, p. 38). The thinking was that decision makers at the top 
created policy and that automatic implementation occurred at the bottom if the policies 
were “authoritatively proclaimed” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 185). The approach is 
viewed as elitist and prescriptive in its governance outlook since the few elected 
representatives take ownership of decision making in implementation                      
(Pulzl & Trieb, 2007). 
According to this approach, researchers question; “to what extent were the action of 
implementing officials and target groups consistent with … policy decision, to what 
extent were the objectives attained over time, what were the principal factors affecting 
policy outputs and impacts and how was the policy reformulated over time on the basis 
of experience” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 187). Paudel (2009) observes that the 
generation’s research is “atheoretical, case specific and non-cumulative” and that, due 
to its “policy centered” approach, it firstly relies on the policymaker’s capacity to control 
the environment and implementers and, secondly, assumes the convergence of actions 
of implementers and goals of authoritative decision makers, which may be lacking. 
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 Second generation studies (1980’s – 90’s) 1.3.3.2
 
The second generation, including Mazmanian, Sabatier and Lipsky, questioned the 
assumptions of the first generation’s reliance on the rational model and highlighted the 
complexity of process and political influences (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 185) and 
viewed implementation as a bottom up process. 
This generation developed an “analytical framework” which analysed and described 
causal links between policy and practice, brought into prominence the importance of 
time period factors and recognised variables that contributed to implementation success 
or failure (Paudel, 2009, p. 39). The generation also advocated for an analysis that 
focused “on those who are charged with carrying out the policy rather than those who 
formulate and convey it,” with some even advocating for the “desirability” of “discretion” 
at lower levels (Brynard & de Coning, 2006) and identifying “street level bureaucrats” as 
instrumental for guiding the day to day activities of implementation.  
Some researchers paid regard to “the multi-actor and inter-organizational character of 
policy delivery” and therefore advocated for a stakeholder analysis and how these 
stakeholders attended to implementation issues (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 93). Unlike the 
top down elitist approach, the bottom up approach included participatory democracy 
principles of governance and recognised the power and interests of citizens at local 
levels of society (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 94). 
 
Table 1: Bottom up and Bottom down implementation models adopted from Paudel (2009, p. 40) 
Variables Top-down perspective Bottom perspective 
Policy decision-maker Policy maker Street level bureaucrats 
Starting point Statutory language Social problems 
Structure  Formal  Both formal and informal 
Process Purely administrative Networking, including 
administrative 
Authority  Centralization Decentralization 
Output/outcomes Prescriptive  Descriptive 
Discretion Top-level bureaucrats  Bottom-level bureaucrats 
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 Third generation studies – combination (1990’s onwards) 1.3.3.3
 
Instead of focusing on the top down and bottom up approach, the third generation 
attempted to synthesise and bridge the gap. This generation studied the weaknesses 
and strengths of preceding generations and how different variables impacted on 
implementation and sought to understand “how it works in general and how its 
prospects might be improved” (Brynard & de Coning, 2006, p. 184). The researchers 
aimed to be “more scientific” in their research methodology (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 89) 
and suggested research designs guided by forward and backward mapping analysis, 
studying the effects of ambiguity and conflict and conducting tests dependent on 
comparative case studies and statistics (Paudel, 2009). 
The generation also introduced the notion of linking implementation analysis to policy 
formulation, recognising multiple effects of other policy disciplines and the impact of 
policy types (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 97). Wildavsky later joined this generation and 
discarded the notion of a linear, rational top down approach, and argued that 
implementation was an evolving concept and decisions of policy makers at the top could 
be modified by implementers during the process. This generation regarded policy 
bureaucrats as political actors in their own right (Pulzl & Trieb, 2007, p. 96). 
 
 The 5-C Protocols 1.3.3.4
 
Brynard & de Coning (2006, pp. 182-184) present another form of analysis through 
introducing 5 common variables (5-C Protocols) of implementation. The 5-C protocols 
approach considers the three different generations. According to Brynard & de Coning, 
the 5-C protocols are driven by issues of content, context, commitment, capacity and 
clients/coalitions. Issues of the means and measures adopted to achieve the policy 
objectives are informed by content. Context provides institutional understanding on 
where and how the policy operates or travels. Commitment addresses issues of 
implementers and their attitude (willingness and ability) towards implementation. 
Capacity informs on the existence or non-existence of administrative and other 
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capabilities for doing the job. Finally, clients and coalition support or lack thereof 
identifies issues of interests and how these affect actors in promoting or frustrating 
implementation. 
The debates of different generations confirm Paudel’s (2009, p. 36) observation that 
implementation “takes different shapes and forms in different cultures and institutional 
setting” and therefore the research acknowledges that implementation possesses 
salient elements of subjectivity, values and characteristics or context. Pulzl & Trieb 
(2007, pp. 100-101) on summarising the studies of the different generations adds to the 
debate on how the different generations resulted in the concept being developed by 
perspectives of; accepting the third generation model which combines the authoritative 
direction and local participatory style of governance, the value of the political process 
and its influence on redefining the direction of the authoritativie policy maker introduced 
by bottom up generation, the interdependent nature of policy formulation and 
implementation, the influence of different disciplines in implementation, and finally, the 
context of different implementation styles. It is argued in this research that the 5-C 
protocols outlook lives up to the observations of Pulzl & Trieb (2007) and, due to its 
incorporation of all the other generations, the research therefore adopts that approach. 
The adoption of the 5-C protocol approach provides the study with the “crucial 
variables” identified as lacking by Paudel above. The research also adopts the view of 
defining policy as an output. Implementation therefore in the research relates to actual 
activities undertaken by different SA intervening actors to ensure execution of the SA 
policy on peace missions. The definition excludes issues of processes and outcome of 
implementation. 
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 Peacebuilding  1.3.4
 
Development of the concept 
Cousens (2001) traces the current peacebuilding approach to the end of the cold war 
when the international community realised that a comprehensive approach to securing 
lasting peace could not be achieved through reliance on short term military and security 
peace missions. In pursuance of a comprehensive approach, the UN Secretary-General 
(UNSG) Boutros-Ghali introduced “An Agenda for Peace Document” in 1992. The 
document recognised “post conflict peacebuilding” as a fourth and complementary pillar 
to activities of “preventative diplomacy”, “peacemaking” and “peacekeeping”    
(Cousens, 2001, p. 2). In 1996, the UN produced a list of peacebuilding tasks in its 
“inventory of post-conflict peacebuilding activities” (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 277). 
In 2000, the UNSG, Kofi Annan, appointed Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi as chair of a 
high level panel to “produce tangible and implementable recommendations to improve 
UN peacekeeping and related activities” (Durch, 2000, p. 3). The findings of the Brahimi 
report mainly informed the establishment of the current UN peacebuilding architecture. 
Later Annan in the “No Exit without Strategy” document further developed the concept 
and linked peacekeeping as a UN entry strategy into peace missions and peacebuilding 
as the exit strategy. According to this peacekeeping should “include elements of 
peacebuilding in their mandate to dismantle the structures of violence and create the 
conditions conducive to peace and sustainable development” (Sriram, Martin-Ortega, & 
Herman, 2011, p. 10). Conditions of peace and sustainable development were viewed 
as central to the peacebuilding agenda. 
Kings & Matthews (2012) note positive steps undertaken in the last twenty years, since 
the adoption of the agenda for peace document. Firstly peacebuilding was 
institutionalised by the UN, regional organizations and individual states. Secondly the 
acceptability of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle was entrenched in 
international law. According to Powell (2005, p. 1), the effect of the R2P is that 
sovereignty of the state is “conditional” and dependent on its ability to capacity and 
willingness to protect its citizens. Kings & Matthews in pursuing this thinking further note 
that in peacebuilding the R2P further empowers external actors with the “responsibility 
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to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild” states where a sovereign state is unable or 
unwilling (2012, p. 280). 
Apart from discussing the positive elements, Kings & Matthews (2012) also discuss the 
shortfalls attributed to the agenda for peace e.g. the action and outcomes of intervening 
actors and their failure to establish durable peace, failure to coordinate activities and 
mandates on the ground and challenges in implementation of the R2P principle 
informed by its contested nature. 
 
 Defining the term 1.3.4.1
 
Kings & Matthews (2012), Sriram et al, (2011, p. 8) Jenkins (2008, p. 4), and      
Cousens (2001) agree on the lack of a uniform definition, activities and roles of actors in 
peacebuilding. Cousens (2001) and Jenkins (2008) suggest that the divergent views are 
influenced by angles of interrogation and interests of actors. Cousens (2001) distils the 
differences into two main thrusts of deductive or inductive approaches. The deductive 
one refers to “where the content of peacebuilding is deduced from the existing 
capacities and mandates … inductive where the content of peacebuilding is determined 
by the particular matrix of needs and capacities in individual cases” (Cousens, 2001, p. 
5). 
Cousens (2001) links the deductive approach to the 1992 agenda for peace document 
and criticises the approach for focusing on “what” the needs of post conflict societies 
are and “who” could address them. According to Cousens (2001), the approach ignores 
questions associated with “how”, “why” and “to what end”.  
The agenda for peace document defined peacebuilding as action designed to “identify 
and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid 
a relapse into conflict”. Sriram et al (2011), on the other hand, identify peacebuilding as 
activities that “seeks to prevent the recurrence of conflict through the provision of 
technical assistance to transform national structures and capabilities and strengthen 
new democratic institutions” (2011, p. 9). Ali & Matthews (2004, pp. 7, 395) view 
peacebuilding as involving the existence of positive peace instead of negative peace. 
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Busumtwi-Sam links political, social and economic development to the achievement of 
“sustainable peace” and states that the linkage is “integral to the notion of 
peacebuilding” (2004, p. 315). Sustainable peace is defined as “peace that can be 
expected to persist without extraordinary international intervention” by Serwer & 
Thomson (2007, p. 372). 
To reach a definition of peacebuilding, the research adopts the view that achievement of 
sustainable peace as defined by Serwer & Thomson (2007) is critical in peacebuilding. 
To understand the influence and quest for ensuring sustainable peace, questions of the 
common characteristics of post conflict societies, commencement of peacebuilding and 
activities of actors are interrogated to inform a suitable definition of peacebuilding. 
 
 Characteristics of post conflict societies  1.3.4.2
 
There is general consensus that peacebuilding applies to societies emerging from 
conflict. Ball (1996) provides an understanding of these societies and identifies four 
common characteristics which relate to; institutions, economic and social conditions, 
security and context of peace process. Ball (1996) paints a bleak picture of these 
societies and argues that to avoid a one size fits all approach to peacebuilding, activities 
should be designed around, and address, these characteristics. Ball (1996) describes 
the characteristics in the following manner. 
Institutions: Public and civil society institutions are weak. The state, whilst appearing to 
be in control and better organised than other formations cannot in reality perform its 
functions. Needs of citizens are not met by state institutions. Trust levels between 
groups and political authorities are low and power struggles are pronounced as different 
groups fight for limited resources.  
Economic and social conditions: Infrastructure is either destroyed or out dated e.g. 
communication, roads, banking systems, health care and educational facilities. There is 
a reduction of trade and economic activity resulting in contacts with international actors 
being reduced or terminated. There is migration and displacement of the population and 
human capacity is affected as professionals seek greener pastures. 
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Security: During the conflict, the societies prioritised their security budgets to the 
detriment of other commitments. After the conflict, the societies are expected to 
reconfigure their resources, including security personnel and budgets. The demands of 
the security sector and general social sector have to be sensitively balanced e.g. 
demobilisation, integration and provision of social services to the general population. 
The security services are also expected to conform to internationally recognised 
standards of behaviour e.g. principles of accountability and transparency which were 
either absent or minimally observed during the conflict. 
Context: Isolation at different levels exists. During the conflict, the societies faced 
isolation from the international community, combatants from communities, and 
environment and politicians from the general populace. After the conflict, the different 
actors are expected to integrate into the society. 
Ball’s observations depict abnormal settings where, after the conflict, the society has to 
hit the ground running and ensure a functional society within a limited period. 
Intervening actors are called upon to assist these societies in a manner that takes into 
account their individualised challenges (1996, p. 612).  
 
 Commencement of peacebuilding 1.3.4.3
 
Divergent views influence the notion of commencement. The first relates to termination 
of hostilities and the other to timing of activities. The two views ultimately influence the 
reasoning of whether it is a post conflict activity or not. 
 
Timing of activities 
Jenkins (2008, p. 4) notes that whilst peacebuilding can be viewed as “process that 
takes place after conflict; for others, it can also encompass preventive actions 
undertaken before conflict breaks out”. Ball (1996, p. 612) in attending to this issue, 
draws attention to the different stages of peace processes. 
The first stage is identified as conflict resolution and is informed by phases of 
negotiations and cessations of hostilities, whilst the second stage is peacebuilding. The 
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peacebuilding stage includes transitional and consolidation phases. According to Ball 
(1996), peacebuilding occurring after the establishment of a peace framework is a post 
conflict exercise. Boutros-Ghali’s document and the Brahimi report also placed 
peacebuilding in the context of post conflict. Ali & Matthews (2004, p. 6) state that it 
occurs at “the last phase in the cycle of conflict, beginning when a ceasefire has brought 
an end to fighting and efforts are initiated to revive an economy and to restore its polity”. 
Sarigiannidis (2007) also agrees with this outlook and observes that, since the agenda 
for peace document, the concept has evolved and includes a “broader post-conflict 
agenda”. The research informed by the outlook of the SA policy7, therefore adopts the 
understanding of confining peacebuilding to the post conflict phase of the conflict. 
 
Termination of hostilities 
The Brahimi report and Ball (1996, pp. 611-12) indicate that the manner of terminating 
hostilities determines the nature of peace activities and the question of whether or not 
the activities are linked to peacebuilding. The report (2000, pp. 12-13) makes the 
distinction that termination due to the victory of one party “may attract outside 
reconstruction assistance …[since] the political-military question at the heart of the 
conflict is settled” whilst those that terminate due to negotiations “transfer their fight to a 
political arena” and external international actors are called upon to assist in resolving 
those political questions and ensuring the establishment of durable peace. 
Ali & Matthews (2004, p. 4) disagree with this reasoning and note that “no matter how 
civil wars end, the task of building an enduring peace cannot be escaped” and by this 
observation, caution against the artificial divide introduced by the debate. The reasoning 
of Ali & Matthews (2004) is supported since the distinction does not address the core 
issue of ensuring sustainable peace which is not dependent on how hostilities end but 
on the nature of activities undertaken to ensure the existence of sustainable peace i.e. 
there is no guarantee that because one party won, sustainable peace will prevail as the 
defeated party may still persist with some form of destabilisation. 
Therefore in its formulation of a definition, the research adopts the approach of focusing 
on the nature of peacebuilding activities regardless of how the conflict terminated.  
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 Objectives and activities of peacebuilding  1.3.4.4
 
Ball (1996, p. 612) argues that different phases of peacebuilding encompass different 
objectives. Cousens (2001), Serwer & Thomson (2007) and others do not follow that 
logic but argue for the establishment of a common framework which influences priorities 
of activities. 
 
Objectives 
According to Ball (1996), the transitional phase includes objectives of “establishing a 
Government with adequate legitimacy to enable it to rule effectively, implementing 
reforms to build political institutions … inaugurating economic and social revitalization 
efforts”. The consolidation phase includes “continuation and deepening of reform 
processes” and “continuing economic and social recovery programs”.  
Cousens (2001) asserts that frameworks are generally guided by five objectives which 
focus on addressing broader political contexts in order to “open political spaces”. 
Cousens (2001) identifies the five as “self-enforcing cease-fire” i.e. non-recurrence of 
conflict, “self-enforcing peace” i.e. the prevention of new conflicts, “democracy, justice 
and equity”. Serwer & Thomson’s (2007) framework includes; “safe and secure 
environment, rule of law, stable democracy, sustainable economy and social well-
being”. 
Pursuant to the agenda for peace and the Brahimi report, the UNSC, in 2001, noted that 
“peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of 
armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, 
humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms” and later, in 2006, 
categorised the activities in four themes of security and public order, justice and 
reconciliation, governance and participation and socio-economic well-being (Lambourne 
& Herro, 2008, p. 278). 
Whilst differing on the number of objectives and labelling, the argument presented is the 
need for international actors to be guided by a framework of activities informed by a 
“hierarchy of priorities” (Greener, 2011, p. 365) which encompass “end-states and 
objectives” (Serwer & Thomson, 2007). In addition to assisting with prioritisation, the 
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approach additionally assists in the establishment of common goals and benchmarks, 
identification of areas of intervention, coordination of activities, resource allocation and 
sharing, monitoring and evaluation.  
On prioritisation, Cousens (2001) identifies the goal of achieving “self-enforcing peace” 
as the most important one. Richmond (2011), Greener (2011) and Serwer & Thomson 
(2007) provide insight on other issues that influence the prioritisation debate through 
discussions of the liberal peacebuilding consensus8. 
 
Liberal peacebuilding 
Richmond (2011) asserts that the liberal peacebuilding consensus states that 
“democratic, market and development processes produce sustainable solutions to 
conflict” with peacebuilding activities that focus on free markets, democratization, 
elections, promotion of rule of law and other human rights (2011, p. 44). Greener (2011) 
adds that it conforms to Cousens’ opening of political spaces “with speedy 
democratisation, with swift establishment of market economies and the reconstruction 
or construction of a viable centralised state” (2011, p. 357). Richmond (2011) and 
Greener (2011) critique the approach and note that it fails to address issues of context.  
 
Rule of law 
Richmond (2011) identifies weaknesses linked to prioritisation of the rule of law. 
Richmond (2011) observes that the concept is, inter alia, premised on the existence of a 
social contract between citizens and the state where the former “defer some of their 
freedoms in return for resources and security provided by the state”. Richmond (2011) 
further notes that the social contract theory results in the elevation of individual rights 
and freedoms and constrains actions of the state. The argument presented therefore is 
that societies emerging from conflict cannot enter into this social contract with its 
citizens since they lack capacity and control. Richmond’s assessment can be linked to 
Ball’s study which identified institutional weaknesses of these societies.  
Richmond (2011) also observes that the rule of law debate assumes the presence of a 
common understanding of a certain form of “rule of law institutions and processes” and 
places these at the centre of prioritisation. Richmond (2011) argues against this 
36 
 
assumption and identifies its deficiencies. Firstly, the rule of law concept lacks uniform 
interpretation and application in different societies and therefore the assumption ignores 
the existence of different cultures and rules. Secondly, the imposition of a uniform 
interpretation and application may result in negative consequences e.g. the creation of 
new institutions and elite. Richmond (2011) further argues that, due to its form, the 
concept of rule of law results in recipient countries viewing it suspiciously as a tool that 
assists intervening actors in pursuing their own political interests and agendas. 
Whilst not totally discarding the liberal peacebuilding thinking, Richmond (2011) then 
directs the debate to the variation of “peace as governance” which “focuses on the 
institutions of state as a basis for the construction of the liberal peace   international 
actors … focus upon reordering in the distribution of power, prestige, rules, and right in 
the state and state institutions. NGOs … focus on the governance of society” (2011, p. 
46). Richmond (2011) argues that the peace as governance “permeates bottom-up 
approaches to peacebuilding”. Loumbourne & Herro (2008, p. 276) concur with 
Richmond (2011) on the need for a bottom up approach to peacebuilding. However, 
Loumbourne & Herro (2008) disagree on whether or not the peace as governance 
approach achieves a bottom up approach due to the fact that it ignores the “human 
factor” and, according to their assessment, results in a top down approach to 
implementation. 
 
Democratization  
Apart from the rule of law priority, some liberal peacebuilding practitioners place 
emphasis on the goal of democracy. Proponents link democracy to the establishment of 
peace by arguing on two major fronts. The arguments advanced are that democratic 
societies are more prone to be peaceful towards each other and the other that they are 
“peaceful in and of themselves” and therefore establish the existence of a “positive 
relationship between democratic political systems and levels of domestic peace” 
(Greener, 2011, p. 360). 
Critics, on the other hand, do not challenge the validity of democratic principles, but 
question its blanket approach and expectations imposed on societies emerging from 
conflict. The main thrust is that democratic principles are by their nature conflictual and 
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need to operate in mature and functional political systems. The principles are viewed as 
inappropriate in post conflict societies because of the characteristics of their institutions 
and democratisation is therefore viewed as a potential source of conflict in such 
societies. Ottaway (2007) thereafter introduces the notion of differentiation between 
coercive and spontaneous democratization.  
Coercive democratization is described as “the attempt to use outside pressure and 
support to bring about democratic transformation in countries where the domestic 
balance of forces by itself would not lead to democracy” (2007, p. 611). Ottaway (2007) 
notes that peace processes have limited time frames and intervening actors tend to be 
guided by these in ensuring the achievement of the goal and provide an example of the 
goal achieving democracy through holding of elections. Here, intervening actors are 
said to focus their resources on processes of successful elections after the signing of 
peace agreements and neglect issues of sustainability of future elections. 
Ottaway (2007) argues that coercive democracy results in; lack of buy-in from local 
actors who proceed with programs imposed by intervening actors for fear of isolation, 
lack of capacity and willingness to continue with programs after the departure of 
intervening actors and the possibility of further polarisation of different groups due to 
redistribution of power, including the entrenchment of majoritarian rule (which could be 
problematic where societies have issues of ethnic and religious divisions). 
Similar to Richmond’s variation of peace as governance, Ottaway (2007) suggests the 
adoption of “spontaneous democratization” as it permits states to adopt democracy at a 
pace determined by the context of each recipient country. 
Spontaneous democracy views the pace of democracy as a slow and drawn-out 
process which starts “with the emergence of new political forces and coalitions and 
eventually culminating in the development of democratic political systems, often in 
stages” and coercive democracy is viewed as the process where “the initial period of 
development of new political forces and coalitions is reduced to months or years, new 
constitutions and laws are quickly written with outside technical advice and elections are 
held as soon as the international community can organize them – two years from the 
time of agreement is reached has become the standard in postconflict situations” 
Ottaway (2007). 
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In conclusion it is noted that all authors from Cousens (2001) to Ottaway (2007) agree 
on the need for activities directed at capacity building for local institutions and on the 
importance of involving local actors. As Cousens (2001) suggests, capacity building of 
political institutions provides international actors with “exit strategies” or “reduced 
commitment strategies” which allow “self-enforcement … over time without new 
international intervention” and therefore enables local institutions to manage conflict 
without resorting to violence (2001, pp. 12-14). The main argument therefore is that 
sustainable peace is not achieved through the imposition of ideas, and that intervening 
actors should instead focus on “helping local actors establish the conditions that will 
enable them to make choices in an atmosphere free of large-scale violence, fear, 
deprivation, and privation” (Ali & Matthews, 2004, p. 14).  
As discussed above, issues of discourse arise on the prioritisation of activities where 
discussion by Richmond (2011) and Ottaway (2007) on prioritising democracy and rule 
of law draw attention to the dangers of adopting rigid peacebuilding approaches. The 
discussion also informs the debate that prioritisation of objectives should not be 
imposed by intervening actors, but should be context driven, and take into account the 
peculiar characteristics of each society as failure to do so may result in failure to secure 
a sustainable peace. Context driven prioritisation ensures that other themes of end 
states are not ignored but that their timing and pace is determined by the requirements 
of the society being reconstructed. 
Considering the above discussion, the study defines peacebuilding as “long term post 
conflict activities and tools jointly adopted by local and intervening actors to ensure the 
existence of sustainable peace”. 
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 Chapter 2: Peacebuilding Institutions: National and International 2
 
 Introduction  2.1
The chapter provides an overview of the institutions utilised for peacebuilding at national 
and international level. The exercise reveals a network of numerous and complex sets 
of institutions. The research is premised on the understanding that these institutions 
possess different peacebuilding interests, opportunities. 
 
 South Africa 2.2
 
South Africa’s white paper on peace missions  
The policy adopts the view of implementing comprehensive and holistic peace missions. 
It provides an understanding of what the policy framers envisaged in the different 
concepts found in peace missions, the objectives of participation and activities within 
those concepts. An illustration of the comprehensive peace missions is provided in the 
following diagram. 
 
Diagram 1: SA Peace Mission Design (adopted from the white paper 1999: page 9) 
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According to this policy, peace missions are informed by activities and concepts of 
“preventative diplomacy”, “peace-making”, “peace keeping”, “peace enforcement” 
“peacebuilding”, “humanitarian assistance” and “humanitarian intervention” (1999, pp. 7-
10). The policy later refers to “preventative diplomacy”, “peacebuilding” and “peace-
making” as “the essential pillars of any peace mission” (1999, p. 19). The isolation of 
these three suggests an acknowledgement of their importance and, according to the 
researcher, creates an expectation of prioritisation. 
The policy recognises that types of mission determine the nature and objective of the 
activities (1999, p. 10) e.g. in preventative diplomacy, diplomatic efforts strive to prevent 
or limit the development of disputes and the escalation of conflict between parties, 
whilst peacebuilding activities (1999, pp. 7-8) aim to “support … measures and 
structures that … promote peace and build trust … in order to prevent a relapse into 
conflict”. Peacebuilding activities are identified as long term and directed to attending to 
the root causes of the conflict and not symptoms through “inculcation of respect for 
human rights and political pluralism; the accommodation of diversity; building the 
capacity of state and civil institutions; and promoting economic growth and equity” 
(1999, p. 19). The policy draws a link between issues of governance and capacity 
building in peacebuilding. It identifies the importance of capacity building in matters that 
relate to the “adherence to the rule of law; competent and fair judiciaries … professional 
civil servants with an ethos of democratic governance, and the re-orientation of the state 
and its personnel away from partisan interests towards developmental goals” (1999, p. 
19).  
The policy does not confine peacebuilding to certain stages of the conflict but states that 
it is important in the different phases of the conflict and especially in post conflict phases 
where it involves diplomatic/developmental efforts (1999, p. 8).  
As with activities, there is an acknowledgment of different actors in the different 
concepts. These vary from military to civilian actors and acknowledge the essential role 
of civilians in peacebuilding. DIRCO thereafter commits to initiating and supporting 
mechanisms that would ensure the presence of civilians in peace missions e.g. it 
undertakes to initiate a civilian regional and national system for a data base that will 
“facilitate, and support the selection of civilian volunteers for” peacebuilding, however 
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the policy also admits that existing institutional limitations may hamper this goal (1999, 
pp. 22-23, 31).  
In conclusion, one observes several features of the requirements of the policy. SA 
commits to a comprehensive approach to peace missions which are inclusive of civilian 
and military endeavours. Activities of peace missions are determined by the nature of 
the mission. Peacebuilding missions are long term and whilst these may happen in all 
phases, SA places more emphasis on the post conflict stage and they seek to address 
the root causes of the conflict which can, inter alia, be achieved through institutional 
capacity building activities. DIRCO, the lead department, acts in collaboration with 
international and national stakeholders in the implementation of the policy. Identification 
of the stakeholders (actors) provides insight into their interests and how they can 
facilitate or impede the implementation of the policy. Finally the policy recognises that 
peacebuilding actors are located at national and international levels. 
 
Actors and peace processes 
Brown (2007, p. 40) argues that, in the security field, effective policy makers adopt a 
strategy of engaging other international actors. The policy also recognises this and 
provides that South Africa cannot, in third countries, secure peace on its own and 
adopts the stance of collaborating with UN authorised “coalition of the willing” (1999, p. 
19). This reasoning is informed by the realisation that addressing challenges of state 
failure demand long term commitment from different actors who must make choices, set 
priorities and share the burden (Crocker, 2007, p. 365). However, the collaboration 
outlook suggests that all actors would have the same end state goals which in Burundi 
would have been the implementation of the United Nations Action Plan for Burundi 
(Landsberg, n.d, p. 22). This collaboration also assumes an existence of common 
interests, motives and values from the different actors. However, it is submitted that 
where the “coalition of the willing” does not share these, then individual actors and 
policy makers tend to push for their preferred course of “action within their own systems 
of Government” (Cousens, 2001, p. 188). 
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The understanding of interests, motives and values of the actors in the coalition of the 
willing therefore becomes critical as it determines the forum (multilateral or bilateral 
level) for implementation of policies. Kumar (2001, p. 187) suggests that to accomplish 
this understanding, policymakers must in the different stages of the conflict, analyse 
these by mapping actors’ interests, constituencies, possible impact, existing and longer 
term relationships because, as Cousens (2001) cautions, public pronouncements by 
actors should not be taken at face value.  
The mapping analysis therefore (a) separates publicly stated rationale from real ones 
(b) reveals the real beneficiaries of the conflict (c) identifies those that have a real 
interest in the creation of durable peace and those that could impede or frustrate the 
process (d) provides insight into how the actors can contribute in peacebuilding 
initiatives and (e) enables policy makers to identify and tap into the systems and 
relationships of actors e.g. in the event that the primary actors impede the peace 
process, policy makers can use secondary actors to ensure the occurrence of 
peacebuilding (Cousens, 2001, p. 189). Mapping therefore truly reveals the real 
“coalition of the willing”. Reno (2004, pp. 132-133) indirectly illustrates the value of this 
exercise when providing the example of President Taylor in Liberia, who used the peace 
process to maintain minimum level of security and liberalized markets so that he and his 
associates could access and exploit national and regional resources. This was despite 
his public pronouncements of commitment to the peace process. It is presented that an 
exercise of mapping could have acted as a risk management tool and warned actors 
about his personal motives i.e. the use of the peace process as a tactic and leverage to 
gain access to power and resources.  
 
Identification of actors 
Cousens (2001) makes a distinction between primary, secondary, and external 
intervening actors and notes that primary actors in the conflict are usually ranked in a 
hierarchical order informed by their prominence in the conflict and extent of their 
resources. The secondary actors are said to relate to those associated with the conflict 
whilst intervening external actors include inter-Governmental organizations, 
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Governments, non-Governmental organizations, the private sector and prominent 
individuals. The research pays attention to all three types. 
 
South African Actors 
Presidency 
The policy confines itself to the role of the presidency in the deployment of military 
contingents. However, Malan and Kent (2003, p. 3) identify the direct involvement of the 
presidency in driving and influencing South Africa’s foreign policy agenda, and 
Anderson (1997, p. 64) presents similar observations about the United States of 
America and implies the acceptability of this practice. Therefore the observation is that 
although not directly stated, the decision making process of the presidency directly 
influences the peacebuilding programmes and activities of different national 
departments. The arrangement raises issues of commitment, power and coordination of 
executive dictates and priorities. The dilemma lies with fulfilling commitments of the 
presidency where line departments have not budgeted for particular peacebuilding 
activities and the capacity to coordinate the dictates of presidential preferences. 
 
National departments: 
According to the Government, South Africa utilises its different departments to “lay the 
basis for permanent stability through economic reconstruction, reconstitution of the state 
and nation-building” in its peace missions (Presidency, 2009, p. 62). Therefore different 
departments directed their competencies to addressing peacebuilding initiatives in post 
conflict settings, including Burundi. The arrangement raises issues of whether or not 
departments possess any power in relation to their ability to; choose and prioritise on 
peacebuilding activities; co-ordinate activities between departments, determine their 
entry and exit strategies and ensure availability of resources. Noted also, is that 
departments, whilst positioned at lower levels of decision making in foreign policy, 
control departmental activities and allocation of budget expenditure. These factors could 
directly impact in the implementation of peacebuilding activities.  
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The policy indicates that authorisation and deployment of civilians in peacebuilding 
missions is functionally managed between the sending department and DIRCO (1999, 
p. 27). Their participation can be through bilateral or multilateral engagements.  
 
DIRCO 
The policy dictates that DIRCO be the custodian and lead department for coordinating 
Government’s participation in peace missions as it is viewed as an extension of SA’s 
foreign policy (1999, p. 27). DIRCO is supported in this function by its departmental 
structure of the National Office for the Co-ordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) 
(Malan & Kent, 2003). The functions of the NOCPM are central to the implementation of 
the policy as it is an “institution charged with administering the civilian readiness 
system” (1999, p. 30) and ensuring “ad hoc” civilian deployment. The civilian readiness 
system is envisaged as a resource bank for registering, controlling and deploying expert 
civilians in peace missions. 
 
NOCPM and the civilian readiness system 
The policy acknowledges the existence of civilian human resource experts in the 
country who could assist during peace missions. Included in this are civilian skills in the 
fields of; statisticians, human rights, electoral, mediation and medical experts (p.22). 
DIRCO therefore commits itself to; 
a. encourage, facilitate and support the selection of civilian volunteers for specific 
peace missions; 
b. create a “suitable readiness system or resource bank of competent personnel 
residing in South Africa who are available for international assignments which 
promote democracy, human rights and peacebuilding”. This civilian data base 
would profile private individuals and civil servants who have expertise in “foreign 
relations and diplomacy, democracy, and good governance, safety and security , 
justice, transportation, communication and health”; 
c. ensure that the resource bank is located “within a stand-alone non-profit 
organisation”; 
d. submit names of experts and their details to the UN secretariat for employment; 
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e. actively track UN openings; 
f. train some volunteers, and to support the establishment of “relevant civilian 
training courses for those earmarked for international services”; 
g. maintain the option of using the standby list to select and possibly fund 
secondment of individuals to international peace missions; 
h. use the standby system to contract out administrative and logistical support to 
international organisations and NGOs who have an “established presence in the 
field”; and 
i. nationaly, and regionally, promote the idea of a civilian resource bank. 
 
The policy recognises the inherent limitations of implementing the idea of the resource 
bank e.g. civilian participation, as opposed to military deployment. One is its posture of 
being a voluntary exercise left to “individual choice” (p. 29). The placing of a name in the 
data base would therefore not guarantee the availability of that individual during a 
particular deployment. Secondly, DIRCO realises its limited influence in the deployment 
of individuals to the inter-Governmental bodies since the demands of the receiving body 
determine the level and size of civilian contribution. Lastly, procedures for deployment 
are identified as dependent on the “enthusiasm” of DIRCO and “efficacy of the civilian 
readiness arrangement” (p. 31). 
 
African Renaissance Fund (ARF) 
The policy indicates that DIRCO should take the lead in securing finances for South 
African participation in peace missions (1999, p. 28). This demand was met with the 
establishment of the African Renaissance Fund and International Co-operation Fund 
(ARF) through Act no 51 of 2000. ARF was created to operationalise and give effect to 
the African Renaissance policy introduced by President Mbeki (Landsberg, 2012, p. 
440). The fund provides a “mechanism through which donor (third party) funds could be 
channelled to recipient and/or joint tripartite projects” (DIRCO, 2003). 
It is financed by the SA Government and other sources, which may include third party 
donors. Section 4 states that the fund is to be used for; 
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a. “co-operation between the Republic and other countries in particular African 
countries; and  
b. the promotion of democracy and good governance 
c. the prevention and resolution of conflict 
d. socio-economic development and integration; and  
e. humanitarian assistance and human resource development”. 
 
DIRCO is the principal custodian of the fund and manages it under the direction of its 
Minister. Section 5 provides for the creation of an advisory committee led by the 
Director-General of DIRCO and supported by two members from the Department of 
Finance. The funds are dispersed by the Minister of International Relations after 
consultation with the Minister of Finance and upon receipt of recommendations from the 
advisory committee. The funds are dispersed after project and programme applications 
are received from different national departments. The receiving departments have to 
utilise the funds in accordance with the agreement between the ARF and the spending 
department. Parliament has an oversight role on ARF expenditure.  
The creation of the ARF provides added leverage and availability of funds for 
departments to fund projects excluded from their financial planning cycle and 
departmental objectives. Besharati (2013, p. 32) notes that due to the “limitations” and 
ineffectiveness of ARF, “the SA National Treasury in 2006 started an internal evaluation 
of the ARF” which could inform debates around a formation of a new SA development 
agency i.e. The SA Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). A discussion of the 
institution is not pursued as it has yet to operate in the SA’s peacebuilding initiatives. 
According to the policy, DIRCO sits at the apex and highest decision making function on 
peace missions, whilst reality indicates that the presidency has immense influence on 
the agenda setting of the country’s peace missions. DIRCO is also the main coordinator 
of the policy, whilst implementation is vested with different departments and the 
international community. However, Landsberg (2012, p. 447) observes that in reality 
DIRCO has “struggled to be effective and to bring about greater synergies between 
peace missions on the continent and [its] Africa desks”. Landsberg’s (2012) observation 
suggests that implementation of the civilian participation in peacebuilding activities is 
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hampered by DIRCO’s internal institutional arrangements and that a need arises for 
policy reform in this instance.  
 
Parliament  
Parliament’s role in the deployment of civilians during peacebuilding activities is limited. 
The thrust of parliament’s responsibility is limited to its financial oversight function where 
it monitors and calls officials to account on Government spending and financing of 
individuals engaged in peace missions. This was influenced by the design on the policy 
which indicates that its parliamentary adoption secured approval for all future civilian 
deployment and participation “in international peace missions” (1999, p. 27). This is in 
contrast to the rigid constitutional employment requirements for military personnel. 
 
Individuals 
Individuals access peacebuilding initiatives through three different routes. Individuals 
can be seconded to implementing bodies, directly employed by an implementing body 
or directly engaged by the sending Government. The nature of employment has 
different financial implications for the Government. 
Individuals directly appointed within inter-Governmental organisations are paid by the 
employer (UN). Seconded individuals and those directly employed by the Government 
may be jointly funded by the sending department and the responsible receiving inter-
Governmental organisation. Sending departments include the item and extent of 
financial implications for the deployment in their annual departmental budget (1999, pp. 
27-28). 
Authorisation for deployment is managed between the sending department and DIRCO. 
The policy dictates that civilians seconded or employed through inter-Governmental 
bodies report to the Head of Mission (1999, p. 16). Civilians directly employed by 
departments report directly to their sending department. 
The different arrangements of civilian employment raise issues of influence, power 
relations and control. Civilians directly placed by the Government in recipient countries 
are in a position to directly pursue the mandate and interests of their sending 
departments whilst those seconded or directly employed by the receiving body have to 
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pursue the mandate of that collective body even for activities and programs that oppose 
their national agenda. Their level of authority and their capacity to influence the agenda 
of the receiving organisation may also be a challenge since agenda setting discussions 
of peacebuilding may be discussed at higher levels e.g. UNPBC and not at the level of 
implementation. 
 
Organised civil society and NGO groups 
The policy lists NGO’s, such as CARE and Save the Children Fund, policy as examples 
of organised actors that may be involved in peace missions. Other groups can be 
community based organisations and civil society organisations. This category of actors 
is found at local and international level. 
Costy (2004, pp. 170-171) and Murithi (2005, p. 47) reflect on the role of these 
organisations. The authors state that theoretically the organisations address root 
causes by strengthening democratic institutions and increasing the role of citizens in 
political, social and economic processes. However in practice, they may pose a threat to 
the establishment of durable peace. To support this assertion, Costy (2004) uses the 
case of Mozambique to illustrate how agendas of local civil society groups driven by 
external donor funders dictate the focus of activities, style and content of issues to be 
addressed. Murithi (2005) also notes that research indicates that “many international aid 
organisations had subordinated their aims and principles in order to cooperate … with 
global powers to achieve desired outcomes in particular countries” (2005, p. 47). Costy 
(2004) also mentions that these organisations also encourage dependency relationships 
which undermine the true participatory nature of citizens in processes of peacebuilding. 
Richmond (2011, p. 55) also observes that the relationship between civil society, NGOs 
and international actors is fraught with contestation and points out that intervening 
international actors drive and influence the local civil society agenda of peacebuilding by 
introducing their own form of liberal peacebuilding. Implications of the liberal 
peacebuilding approach were discussed in the previous chapter. 
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 The African Union and other regional institutions 2.1
 
The African Union 
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004 through article 5(2) of 
the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act and article 2(1) of the protocol (AU). The 
protocol9 directly speaks to the need for the AU to undertake peacebuilding measures 
for the prevention of conflict or “resurgence of violence” as establishment of peace and 
security in the region is among the top priorities of the AU (Moolakkattu, 2010). The 
PSC, situated under the office of the chairperson of the commission is supported by 
institutions of the panel of the wise, continental early warning system and African 
standby force. The PSC undertakes peacebuilding projects through “formal state 
institutions, whether at continental, regional, national or local levels” (Moolakkattu, 2010, 
p. 161). 
Tieku (2012) analyses the post war reconstruction doctrine of the AU. Tieku (2012) 
notes that the doctrine is informed by the determination to ensure; that peacebuilding 
frameworks are results of “political rather than technical” processes, are informed by 
priorities and actual need of recipient countries, and respect for local institutions and 
practices. The AU developed six principles to guide countries in negotiating and the 
framing of peacebuilding frameworks and these are ‘African leadership, national and 
local ownership, inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, cooperation and 
cohesion, and capacity building for sustainability” (Tieku, 2012, p. 384). 
Criticism of the implementation of AU strategies is the subject of various writings. 
Adebajo (2008) indicates the existence of turf wars between AU structures e.g. 
NEPAD10 in 2005, and the AU in 2006 separately developed “post conflict 
reconstruction frameworks” (Adebajo, 2008, p. 139) and institutional “tensions” have 
affected the implementation of activities. 
PSC’s criticism relates to firstly its reliance on the envisaged role of REC’s which were 
identified as crucial implementers of AU policies (Landsberg, 2012, p. 442). The role 
would have resulted in South Africa engaging the SADC for implementation of its 
peacebuilding activities. However in reality they have been found to be weak, lacking in 
financial and logistical capacity (Adebajo, 2008) 
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These challenges are not only confined to the REC’s and PSC but permeate through all 
institutions of the AU. Moolakkattu (2010, p. 161) also identifies lack of funding and 
resources (including human) which lead to the AU being reliant on donor funding which 
result in its independence being undermined. In addition, Moolakkattu (2010), also 
notes that the AU suffers from challenges of poor coordination of activities, specialised 
capabilities being “spread across others arenas of the AU commission” and the lack of 
synergy between policies and implementation of programmes. According to Adebajo 
(2008, p. 136), “Political will and commitment” seems to be the solution to solving these 
challenges. Finally, whilst acknowledging the importance of the AU peacebuilding policy 
and its link to other AU policies, peacebuilding ideas are criticised for being “general 
and imprecise, and at time contradictory and incoherent” (Tieku, 2012, p. 386). 
 
Other Governments and their formations 
Actors involved in this category, include the European Union, BRICS, G8 countries and 
different Governments. The AU (Moolakkattu, 2010, p. 158) and ARF and departmental 
structures provide avenues for the funding of peacebuilding projects by these actors 
through bilateral and trilateral arrangements. In these instances, trilateral agreements 
can be between ARF or AU and recipient countries or between SA national department, 
donor country and recipient country. These actors have their own agendas and priorities 
and thus place different demands on the use of their funds. The trilateral agreements 
concluded in partnership with these actors may therefore work against the priorities of 
the recipient Government and, as stated by Moolakkattu (2010), may challenge the 
independence of the AU or SA in the choice and prioritisation of peacebuilding activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 The UN and its agencies 2.2
 
The UN, due to its involvement in peace keeping, is regarded as a central player in post 
conflict peacebuilding initiatives (Sriram, Martin-Ortega, & Herman, 2011, p. 3) and the 
policy acknowledges this and the possible involvement of other regional organisations 
(1999, pp. 14-18). Moolakkattu (2010, pp. 153, 159) notes that the overextension of the 
UN from issues of peacekeeping to peace making and peacebuilding propelled the UN 
to increase utilisation of regional bodies, consequently in African affairs the UN PSC 
and AU PSC frequently interact and cooperate to ensure the existence of peace and 
security.  
The head of the civilian representative of peace missions (SRSG) liaises and 
coordinates activities of the different actors on the ground e.g. UN agencies, regional 
bodies, civil society and others. In addition, the SRSG representative must also 
consider the line functions of the PBC and its structures on the ground. This mammoth 
task has resulted in the UN being frequently criticised for its lack of capacity to 
coordinate and prioritise its peacebuilding activities.  
This is compounded by the fact that the different actors possess different interests, 
benchmarks and goals e.g. whilst the UN Secretary General pushes for donors to assist 
build capacity of regional organisations, the five UNSC permanent members are said to 
have adopted a laissez faire attitude and refused “to fund or sometimes even 
recognise… [regional] efforts, while insisting on maintaining political control over these 
missions” (Adebajo, 2008, p. 135). 
 
The Peacebuilding Commission  
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1645 and United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) resolutions 1645 and 60/180 respectively established the inter-
Governmental structure of the Peace Building Commission (PBC) in 2005 (Mingst & 
Karns, 2007, p. 508). The PBC was established because the UN realised that 
responses to questions of resolving post conflict situations was affected by “shortage of 
funds, lack of coordination and the tendency to leave too hurriedly” (Murthy, 2007, p. 
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47). Article 2, which provides the functions of the PBC, sought to address these 
concerns by focusing on activities that would strive; 
(a) to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on, and 
propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; 
(b) to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary 
for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies 
in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; 
(c) to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all 
relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, 
to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend 
the period of attention given by the international community to post conflict 
recovery”. 
The research explores implementation of activities of SA actors identified in article 2b. 
 
Diagram 2: Structure of the PBC as provided for in article 4 (own illustration) 
 
 
The PBC directly links peacebuilding with the UNSC and other UN agencies. It is 
composed of the Organizational Committee (PBOC), the Peacebuilding Support Office 
(PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The PBC seeks to work with local, national 
and regional actors. Lambourne & Herro (2008) note that it has been found wanting 
since New York held meetings and their “procedures” have virtually excluded 
meaningful participation of local NGO’s and civil society groups. 
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Murthy (2007) also notes two peculiar features on the structural arrangement of the 
PBC. The first relates to the composition of its actors and secondly, its lines of reporting. 
The composition of the PBOC draws personnel from three different organs of the UN 
and also includes a group of other actors. In addition, unlike other UN committees, the 
PBC submits its annual reports directly to the general assembly. In addition to its direct 
reporting lines to the general assembly, it also has direct reporting lines to the UNSC, 
and indirect ones to Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the secretariat office 
of the Secretary General (Lambourne & Herro, 2008).  
As illustrated in diagram 1, the PBOC is represented by stakeholders with different 
interests and values (Jenkins, 2008, pp. 3-6)11 including the option of inviting 
“supplementary actors” who would add value to country specific meetings dealing with 
specific peacebuilding missions (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 282) and it is credited 
with its consultative approach. Yet some have indicated that the consultative nature of 
the PBC is its greatest weakness since it contributes to non-delivery of its mandate 
(Jenkins, 2008). Murthy (2007, pp. 46,52) also finds fault with the fact that its decisions 
are advisory and recommendatory, and therefore not binding on other actors and lastly 
that its level of authority is problematic as it is pitched at a lower level compared to other 
UN commissions e.g. Commission for Human Rights (2007, p. 52).  
The PBSO is the engine for administration and secretariat work of the PBC. It “supports 
the work of the PBC”, “oversees operations of the PBF”, “coordinates” all meetings of 
the PBC and “liaises” will all actors and advises the secretary general and the UN 
system on the development of peacebuilding strategies (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 
282). 
The PBF is financed through voluntary contributions and this is identified as a 
weakness, since it results in lack of adequate funding for the commission (Murthy, 2007, 
pp. 45,52). The PBF supports peacebuilding of post conflict countries and those under 
consideration for funding by the PBC (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 282). 
However, the structural configuration of the PBF could be viewed as advantageous 
since it allows countries who have accessed the PBC to directly access funding from 
the PBF e.g. Resolution UNSC 1791 (2007) and UNGA 1719 (2006) mandated the PBC 
to carry out its function in Burundi in 2006. The act enabled Burundi to receive funding 
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from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Murthy, 2007, p. 53) and 
thus implement its peacebuilding activities through the UN Integrated Office in Burundi 
(BINUB)12 (Ayebari, n.d, p. 85; Ameir, 2008, p. 108) in accordance with the recipient’s 
country peacebuilding framework (UNPBC, 2007) and the PBOC peacebuilding 
framework (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 282). 
 
 Conclusion 2.3
 
SA’s comprehensive approach to peace missions places a huge burden on DIRCO and 
its function of coordination and collaboration with different stakeholders at national and 
international levels. The institutions identified in the chapter are numerous and pose a 
challenge for implementation of the policy. It is evident that according to the policy 
implementation is not only dependent on SA actors, but also on others at the regional, 
international level and the recipient country. The identification, mapping and formation 
of partnerships with different actors who possess different and varied interests become 
pivotal for determination of the “coalition of the willing”.  
Apart from the different interests, the exercise reveals different deficiencies within the 
different institutions which vary from lack of; financial and human resources, proper 
coordination mechanisms due to duplication and blurring of reporting lines, and clarity 
on policies. It is observed that it is possible to find that even when actors are capable of 
forming coalitions through sharing of similar interests, the said coalition could be 
jeopardised by institutional deficiencies. It is therefore suggested on identifying suitable 
partners within the coalition of the willing SA should not only be guided by abstract 
considerations (interests and values) but also by practical ones (availability of resources 
that could enhance implementation). 
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 Chapter 3: Burundi case study 3
 
 Introduction  3.1
 
The chapter provides context on the Burundi case study including the political and 
historical background of the conflict. Peacebuilding institutions are discussed and 
insight is provided on appropriate peacebuilding activities that should have been 
adopted. The argument presented is that the historical context of conflict informs 
peacebuilding activities and demands attendance to issues raised by Ball (1996) when 
discussing the common characteristics of post conflict societies. 
 
 Historical context of Burundi 3.2
 
Political history of Burundi 
The Burundi conflict occurred over various time frames and intervals. This is relevant 
since Levy (2007, p. 20) notes that any study of conflict must contextualise the violence 
and explore why it occurred at a particular period. The period under consideration in this 
research therefore relates to atrocities and peace initiatives after the 1994 plane crash 
which claimed the lives of the Rwanda and Burundi Presidents (Ameir, 2008; Mezzera, 
Pavicic, & Specker, 2009). It is presented that the crash triggered existing grievances, 
resulting in another cycle of violence. The intervention of the international community 
during this cycle culminated in the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in August 
2000. The agreement did not in itself bring an end to the violence as atrocities 
persisted, albeit at lower levels, e.g. 1,657 rapes were reported in 2004, whilst Save the 
Children Fund in the same year reported Burundi as one of the worst conflict zones in 
the world for women and children (Eggers, 2006). 
Burundi attained independence from Belgium on 1 July 1962. Levy (2007, p. 19) 
categorises the post-independence conflicts of Burundi as “intrastate war” with a 
“transnational dimension”. Similar to other intrastate conflicts (Brown, 2007), it led to 
ethnic and group violence, coups, regional and national political instability, displacement 
of citizens, human rights violations, ethnic killings, reprisals and acts of genocide at 
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different time periods e.g. in 1965 about 5000 Hutus were killed in retaliation to the 
killing of about 500 Tutsis, in 1972 about 200,000 deaths occurred with about 300,000 
persons exiled, in 1988 about 15,000 died and 50,000 were exiled, in 1991 about 3000 
died and 38,000 were exiled and in 1993 about 300,000 were killed or displaced 
(Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005; Ndikumana, 2005, p. 421)13.  
In June 1993, Presidential elections were conducted and Ndadaye, a Hutu leader of 
FRODEBU, won the elections and replaced President Buyoya in July 1993. In October 
1993, President Ndadaye and some cabinet members were assassinated in a military 
coup. The coup leaders were forced by international pressure to relinquish their power 
in favour of civilian rule, and yet again, FRODEBU assumed control of the country 
(Daley, 2007, p. 81). The 1993 coup resulted in another cycle of genocide. In April 
1994, President Cyprian Ntaryimana, together with the Rwandan President, died in a 
plane crash and this led to the Rwandan genocide and the formation of a coalition 
Government in Burundi led by President Ntibantunganya (Hutu) and Prime Minister 
Nduwayo (Tutsi). The coalition Government collapsed in June 1995 (Daley, 2007, p. 
85), and in July 1996, President Buyoya re-entered the political scene through a military 
coup. The regional leaders (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, and Ethiopia), in their summit of 31 July 1996, condemned the coup and 
imposed sanctions against Burundi (Ameir, 2008) whilst the western countries 
supported the coup as they thought Buyoya would bring stability in the country (Daley, 
2007, p. 87). 
 
Phases of the Arusha agreement  
Mwanza (April to June 1996) and Arusha 1 (1996 – October 1999) 
Due to the continued political instability after the 1993 coup, Tanzanian President 
Nyerere was appointed by the regional heads of the Great Lakes as a mediator in 
November 1995. The peace process was viewed by these leaders as a regional 
initiative where other stakeholders were to play a supportive role. The regional efforts 
under the leadership of Tanzania initially began in Mwanza in April 1996, and on its 
failure to produce required results, relocated to Arusha in June 1988                      
(Ameir, 2008, p. 75). 
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According to Daley (2007, pp. 196-198), the region held numerous meetings and 
finalization of the talks was delayed due to reasons of uncooperative behaviour between 
the political parties, employment of delaying strategies, procedural differences and the 
Government’s reluctance to succumb to regional influences which included the 
involvement of external mediators and a “regional peace keeping force”. The 
intervention force was, in 1996, eventually introduced as an Organisation of the African 
Union (OAU) observer mission and was reduced from the initial plan of “180 soldiers 
and 30 civilians” to “46 civilian and unarmed military personnel”. 
Whilst lasting peace was not achieved, Nyerere is credited with having brought together 
the major political actors to discuss a political solution and the guarantee of a neutral 
military component to protect the leaders of the different political parties and the 
establishment of demobilisation areas (Ayabare, 82). 
 
Pretoria and Burundi - Arusha 2 (October 1999 – 2006) 
On the demise of President Nyerere in October 1999, Ugandan President Museveni 
temporarily occupied the role of mediator until SA President Mandela assumed the role 
of facilitator in December 1999. Mandela is credited with bringing further international 
attention to the Burundi peace process and exertion of pressure on political actors 
which culminated in the signing of the Arusha Agreement in 2000 (Oleynik, Alexander, 
& Cherepanya, 2005). 
After the signing of the agreement the SA Deputy President of South Africa, Zuma, 
replaced Mandela. Zuma was mandated to bring to the table forces that had not signed 
the Arusha peace agreement e.g. the Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-
FDD). The CNDD-FDD signed the Pretoria protocol on political defence and security 
power and the power sharing agreement in 8 October 2003 (Oleyinik, Alexander, & 
Cherepanya, 2005). Zuma is also credited with ensuring the establishment of the 
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the AU deployment of its peace keeping force 
and later its takeover (re-hatting) by the UN. 
Charles Nqakula, a South African minister for public safety and security, was appointed 
in May 2006 as a facilitator after Zuma. Nqakula’s main mandate was to ensure the 
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inclusion of Palipehutu-FNL in the peace process and this was achieved in December 
2008. 
 
Burundi conflict 
The pattern of violence in Burundi cannot be divorced from the history of regional 
colonial history and its regional post-colonial conflicts. After the end of World War 1, 
Rwanda and Burundi initially German colonies, joined the DRC as Belgian colonies 
(Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005). Daley (2007, p. 1) illustrates the impact of 
this historical interconnectivity and notes that the 1994 Rwandan genocide resulted in 
the death of 7000 lives whilst between 1998-2005 the DRC reported deaths of about 3.8 
million.  
Oleynik et al (2005) and other authors converge and identify ethnicity as central to the 
regional conflicts of the Great Lakes. The question posed is whether or not ethnic 
issues were the cause of the conflict or the manifestation of other existing grievances? 
The establishment of this question is relevant since the policy under consideration 
directs actors to attend to the underlying causes of conflict in order to create durable 
peace. Secondly, the inductive approach of peacebuilding (Cousens, 2001) adopted in 
this research demands proper understanding of conflict root causes as the exercise 
provides insight into the nature of grievances and motives for participation in the 
conflict. The inductive approach also provides policy makers with tools that assist in the 
identification of appropriate policies that reduce the risk of future violent conflicts 
(Stewart & Brown, 2007, p. 227; Mack, 2007, p. 531). 
 
Root causes of the Burundi conflict 
Brown (2007, p. 47) argues that understanding violent ethnic conflicts demands the 
drawing of a distinction between “parochial motivations that galvanize these conflicts 
and the ethnic consequences that follow”. Authors (Ndikumana (2005), Stewart and 
Brown (2007) De Rouen et al (2010) and Daley (2007) agree with Brown, and note that 
in Burundi, ethnicity was the “consequence” and not the underlying cause of the conflict. 
Authors have identified different parochial motivations and the discussion below sheds 
insight into these. 
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Access to power and weak institutions 
Ndikumana (2005, pp. 413-414,418) and De Rouen et al (2010, p. 341) attribute the 
Burundi conflict to institutional failure caused by the unequal distribution of power and 
resources between different ethnic groups. The argument of power relations is also 
given credence in the Arusha Agreement. Protocol 1, article 4, of the agreement draws 
a link between politics, ethnicity and power as root causes of the conflict in Burundi. It 
attributes the conflict to the “struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in 
power”. The existence of these types of conflicts14 is acknowledged by Stewart & Brown 
(2007, pp. 220-221) who specifically categorize the type of conflict in Burundi as one 
“fought to gain (retain) political supremacy by particular groups representing specific 
cultures (ethnicities or religion)”. It is evident that power relations were a critical factor 
and informed the grievances of certain sections of the population. The state, through its 
weak institutions, contributed to galvanizing these grievances. 
 
Colonization  
Busumtwi-Sam (2004, p. 321) and Levy (2007, pp. 29-30) present the negative 
influence of colonialism and its contribution to conflicts and Daley (2007) contextualises 
this argument and suggests that post-colonial conflicts in Burundi are consequences of 
Belgian misunderstanding of African institutions. Daley (2007) further argues that the 
misunderstanding fuelled cultural differences, violence/genocide and inequalities and 
supports this reasoning with reference to an official 1938 proclamation which provided 
that: 
“the Belgian government is convinced that it must continue to maintain and consolidate 
the traditional position of the Tutsi governing class because of its great qualities, its 
undeniable intellectual superiority, and its potential to lead” (Daley, 2007, p. 49). 
 
A reflection of the different authors, phases and consequences of the conflict in Burundi 
supports the view that the conflict was based on fighting between two major ethnic 
groups (Hutu and Tutsi). The group in power sought to maintain its grip whilst the 
excluded one tried to assert itself into power. Their actions suggest elements of 
rationality in their decision making in relation to aspirations to gain or fear of losing 
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power. Secondly, scarcity of resources were also material to the conflict and this is 
supported by the understanding that perusal of the different phases of the conflict 
indicates that the group in power used its access to state resources (civil service and 
security forces) to purge or exclude other groups. The combination of these two 
observations supports the view that the conflict in Burundi cannot be divorced from 
issues of how colonisation re-configured the society, informed “inequality” and 
assumptions of “ethnic … differences”. Whilst Ndikumana (2005), Stewart & Brown 
(2007) and De Rouen et al (2010) do not give prominence to the role of colonialism, 
their findings are not negated by this additional element i.e. political and economic 
inequality and use of ethnicity to exclude others from power and resources. 
The research adopts this stance, and informed by the readings of these authors, 
concludes that whilst the conflict manifested itself in ethnic consequences, the 
underlying causes of the conflict were informed by weak institutions initially introduced 
by colonisation and the fight over access to power. The weak institutions resulted in the 
exclusion and marginalisation of certain ethnic groups in the political, economic and 
social activities of the country. This exclusion of others, based on ethnicity and gender, 
led to group motivation for participation in the conflict. 
It is therefore suggested that successful peace initiatives must address these causes 
and that peace efforts that ignore them will result in failure. It is further argued that the 
parochial motives identified link with the study of Stewart & Brown (2007), discussed 
below, on the need to address horizontal inequalities of the Burundi society. Oleynik et 
al (2005) also illustrate the dangers of failure to adopt this reasoning and note as an 
example the result of 1996 piecemeal approach which failed to address the root causes 
of the conflict i.e. the Government of Burundi then banned ethnic labelling and this act 
failed to produce the desired results of establishing durable peace and political stability 
(Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005). 
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 Identification of peacebuilding activities 3.3
 
Stewart & Brown (2007) interrogate factors that demonstrate the vulnerability of 
countries to conflict relapse and failure of ensuring sustainable peace for countries 
emerging from conflict. The vulnerability factors relate to low income, low human 
development, and history of conflict in the last thirty years, severe horizontal inequalities 
and transitional societies emerging from “strong repressive regimes”. Burundi, 
according to the study, is susceptible to another cycle of conflict as it possesses more 
than one of these factors. Aspects of the study relevant to this research are summarized 
and provided in the table below. 
 
Table 2: Policies that address root causes sourced from Stewart & Brown (2007)  
Purpose of policy Intervention policies Examples of policies 
Policy framed to address 
horizontal inequalities 
 
Policy must be directed to the 
reduction of group inequalities 
which provide group motives. 
The purpose is to ensure 
inclusivity. 
Political inclusivity in decision 
making and institutions of the 
country. 
Social and economic inclusivity 
and creating equal access and 
opportunities through adoption 
of measures that address past 
imbalances. 
 
Policy framed to reduce the 
functionality of the conflict 
 
Policy must be directed to 
private motives 
 
Increase economic 
opportunities and access to 
institutions that enable 
economic independence of 
individuals. 
Policy structured to promote 
equitable and sustainable 
development. 
 
Policy must be directed to social 
contract and environmental 
pressures. 
 
Extension of basic services to 
all and improving the security of 
the country  
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Stewart & Brown (2007) identify Burundi as being in need of measures that address 
group motives due to the existence of horizontal inequalities informed by non-access to, 
and exclusion of, one group to political, social and economic resources. According to 
their study, severe horizontal inequalities which meet resistance for inclusion by those 
holding political power, trigger violent conflict by “giving group leaders a powerful motive 
to organize in order to gain support” (2007, p. 223). Their study therefore indicates that 
efforts directed towards achieving political inclusivity, even in the presence of other 
horizontal inequalities, reduce prospects of violent conflict. An analysis of the peace 
agreement, undertaken in the next section, provides insight into whether its content was 
geared towards addressing horizontal inequalities. The study of Stewart & Brown (2007) 
is used in this research to determine whether or not firstly the Burundi peace agreement 
was designed to address the root causes of the conflict, the horizontal inequalities and 
group motives and secondly whether the activities of SA actors also focused on these 
factors.  
 
 Peace agreements 3.4
 
The Arusha agreement is used as a reference point for investigating Stewart & Brown’s 
(2007) study. This is important since the research is premised on the understanding that 
conflict resolution through peace missions includes addressing root causes of conflict, 
therefore conflict resolution institutions, including peace agreements must be sensitive 
to adopting strategies that prevent relapse into conflict. 
Cousens (2001, pp. 195-196) and Daley (2007, pp. 191, 220) observe that contextually 
crafted peace agreements reduce prospects of further conflict and determine the 
success or failure of peace initiatives. Cousens (2001) also notes that addressing root 
causes assists in; meaningful transformation of political systems, the introduction of new 
rules of engagement and levelling of playing fields, reconfiguration of balances of power 
and enables parties to compromise on their demands as they are incentivised to 
participate in bringing an end to the conflict.  
As noted in the previous chapter, the political context of the Burundi conflict brought to 
the fore issues of powers struggles which resulted in exclusion of certain sections of the 
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population based on ethnic considerations, the consequence of weak institutions and 
fight over scarce resources including power. Therefore an appropriately drafted 
agreement would direct actors to attend to these horizontal inequalities. 
De Rouen et al (2010) and Daley (2007) criticise the drafting of the agreement. Their 
study draws a link between issues of state capacity, intervention and peace agreement 
implementation. They argue that peace agreements that fail to address state capacity of 
weak states results in the failure of peacebuilding and implementation of peace 
agreements. They argue that the Arusha agreement failed to address the root cause of 
weak institutions. The observations of Daley (2007) and De Rouen et al (2010) can only 
be investigated through a content analysis of the agreement and how it addressed 
issues of root causes. 
 
Arusha agreement and attendance to root causes 
The Arusha Agreement was signed by 19 primary actors, and co-signed by 8 secondary 
actors, on 28 August 200015. The agreement consisted of five protocols and five 
annexures which addressed issues in the following manner 
Protocol 1 addresses the “nature of the Burundi conflict, problems of genocide and 
exclusion and their solutions of the conflict and problems of genocide and exclusion and 
their solutions”. Chapter 1 pays attention to the various historical phases of the conflict 
and potential solutions, basic principles that will ensure the elimination of exclusion and 
the creation of a peaceful and just society. Protocol II focuses on “democracy and good 
governance”. It details issues of the final constitutional principles/state and institutional 
arrangements during the transitional period. It therefore addresses matters of 
institutional reforms and the separation of powers and different spheres of Government. 
Protocol III on peace in security matters attends to a general understanding of the 
concept of peace and security, causes, responsibility, victims and results of the 
insecurity and violence in Burundi. Chapter II attends to security sector reforms that 
would protect the citizens and the state in a non-partisan manner. Chapter III addresses 
issues of ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities. Protocol IV attends to matters of 
reconstruction and development. Chapter 1 focuses on the repatriation of exiles and 
internally displaced persons and their integration into society. Chapter II seeks to attend 
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to physical and political reconstruction of the society whilst chapter III addresses issues 
of economic and social development. Protocol V talks to the guarantees on the 
implementation of the agreement and draws to the attention the roles and 
responsibilities of different actors and institutions including the international community 
and the region. 
Assertions of Cousens (2001), Daley (2007) and De Rouen et al (2010), discussed 
above, are investigated to determine whether the content of the peace agreement 
provided a good foundation for addressing the root causes of the conflict. 
The preamble of protocol 1 states that the parties “Resolved to eradicate genocide and 
to reject all forms of division, discrimination and exclusion”. This aspiration links to 
article 4(a) and (b) which recognise that “the nature of the Burundi conflict” is informed 
by “… fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions” which 
emanate “from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power”. 
The protocol reaches this conclusion after an exhaustive descriptive narrative of the 
history of the country from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial phases and notes in 
article 3(3) that atrocities have been committed since independence “against Tutsi and 
Hutu ethnic communities”.  
The agreement therefore recognises issues of exclusion, access to power and the 
political context i.e. effect of colonisation, and the institutionalisation of ethnic 
differences of Burundi as root causes of the conflict. Article 3 however fails to 
adequately speak and address how issues of the weak state contributed to the violence.  
Article 5(1) of Protocol 1, Chapter 11, inter alia, speaks to the “reorganization of the 
State institutions to make them capable of integrating and reassuring all the ethnic 
components of Burundi”. The article introduces common values that should guide this 
new dispensation. These values speak to “justice, the rule of law, democracy, good 
governance, pluralism, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual, unity, solidarity, equality between women and men, … tolerance …”. The 
issues enumerated in this article could speak to the assertions of Daley as they support 
a liberal mode of peacebuilding.  
Article 7 addresses principles and measures that would ensure equality and inclusion of 
all in areas relating to public administration, education, security sector, justice, 
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economy, social services and cultural spheres. The article lists activities that have to be 
undertaken by the state and the citizens e.g. article 7(7) states that “Training, in such a 
way as to include all components of Burundian society, of civil servants, particularly for 
regional and local Government, by establishing a national school of administration”. 
In addressing the political connotations of the Burundi conflict, article 13 in chapter II of 
protocol IV states that “Physical reconstruction and political reconstruction must be 
mutually supportive” with political reconstruction aiming at building a tolerant society 
and the “establishment of the rule of law”. The article thereafter lists activities that 
should be undertaken. The activities include the promotion of human rights, 
democratisation, development and national reconciliation etc. 
The question posed is whether or not the weak state has the capacity and resources to 
implement these provisions. The study of De Rouen et al (2010) is significant in this 
regard, as it links the success or failure of peace agreements’ implementation to 
availability or non-availability of capacity to implement of weak states. The agreement in 
various articles realises this limitation16 and indicates that its success relies on the 
assistance of external actors to implement the agreement. It is therefore argued that this 
was a weakness of the agreement as it placed numerous implementation obligations on 
a state that had no capacity to implement. The success of implementation of the 
agreement was therefore dependent on the commitment and resources of external 
actors. It should be noted that the agreement was also the foundation for the Burundi 
peacebuilding Strategic Framework and Priority Plan. The argument presented is that 
the Arusha agreement therefore transposed its deficiencies to other processes and 
tools of the Burundi peacebuilding programmes. 
 
 International Actors involved in Burundi Peacebuilding 3.5
 
In 2006, Burundi was placed on the agenda of the UNPBC and thus allowing access to 
the UN peacebuilding machinery for its post conflict recovery (Ayabare 85). Resolutions 
of the UNSC 1791(2007) and UNGA 1719 (2006) mandated the PBC to carry out its 
functions in Burundi. As indicated above, the study argues that the foundation (Arusha 
agreement) of peacebuilding in Burundi failed to sufficiently attend to questions of weak 
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institutions and their contribution to the conflict and that this oversight impacted on other 
peacebuilding measures (Strategic Framework and Priority Plan). In 2007, the 
Government of Burundi in consultation with the PBC and other actors developed a 
Strategic Framework for peacebuilding, which included the 2006 Priority Plan of 
peacebuilding (Burundi Government, 2007). The 2006 Priority Plan focussed on issues 
of building strength in matters of; good governance, rule of law within the security 
forces, justice system and human rights and land. Gender mainstreaming was viewed 
as critical in the “entire process of peacebuilding”. The objectives of peacebuilding 
activities were therefore linked to these priorities. The Strategic Framework paid regard 
to the broader political context and this is important as Greener (2011, p. 357) notes 
that disregard of this ensures “meaningless” peacebuilding exercises. The PBC and the 
Government of Burundi called upon all actors to support the plan and align their 
activities to the implementation of the Strategic Framework.  
Zartman & Touval (2007) argue that parties involved in conflict mediation are not 
impartial and harbour desires of fulfilling their own self-interests, and therefore peace 
mediators calculate the timing of their involvement, and the timing is usually premised 
on a threat to their interests or “an opportunity to advance their interests”. Oleynik et al 
(2005), in determining the interests of the mediators of the Burundi peace process, 
observes that the peace process was mainly personalised between countries and sub 
regions with the main actors being the Great Lakes region, President Nyerere of 
Tanzania and South African facilitators. The research identifies the motives and 
interests of these main actors. 
Note should be taken that actors identified in chapter 2 were limited to those that 
directly impact on peacebuilding and the implementation of the policy. The current 
chapter extends the network of actors to those with interest in the peace process and 
therefore those who would directly and indirectly impact on implementation of the policy. 
The link between the two chapters further indicates the level of complexity of actors and 
their involvement in peace missions.  
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South Africa and its interests 
South Africa joined the regional initiative in December 1999, on the demise of President 
Nyerere (Ameir, 2008) and was, through the different phases of the peace process, 
represented by different senior political heads. South Africa overtly states that its 
objective in Burundi was to ensure regional peace and stability. President Mbeki 
summed this up in his 2007 State of the Nation address when he said “… we will 
continue to work with … Burundi… to ensure that conditions of peace and stability thus 
far obtained translates … into … economic reconstruction and social development” 
(ACCORD, 2007, p. 11). However Ameir (2008, p. iv) observes that South Africa used 
its involvement to “penetrate both politically and diplomatically … and consolidate its 
economic presence in the sub- region”. Ameir (2008) and Oleynik et al (2005, pp. 231-
232) question the neutrality of South Africa’s role and argue that it used the Burundi 
peace process to advance its foreign policy and international footprint. According to 
these authors, the establishment of peace and security in Burundi was not the only 
reason for South Africa’s involvement.  
Zartman & Touval (2007, pp. 442-443) indicate that actors use a cost and benefit 
analysis to determine involvement in peace processes. In view of the discussions 
above, it is argued that the timing of South Africa’s involvement in the peace process 
was indeed opportune, since South Africa had recently attained its freedom and was on 
a political moral high ground of having a politically untainted Government in the 
continent. It therefore used the peace mission to spread its influence. The success of 
the peace mission meant recognition that South Africa could be taken as a serious 
player in international politics. Therefore whilst “moral” considerations cannot be ruled 
out, issues of “national interests as well as international interests” identified earlier by 
Neethling (1997) in chapter 2, played a role. These views support Oleynik et al’s (2005, 
pp. 231-232) observations that South Africa used the opportunity to promote the 
national renaissance agenda and establish a footprint into the politics and economy of 
the Great Lakes.  
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Barundi actors 
Daley (2007, pp. 89-91) provides a list of 23 political parties, rebel movements and 
militias in Burundi, in 2000, divided on ethnic preferences. The peace talks of 7 August 
2000 resumed with 19 political parties in Arusha (Tanzania) and a meeting in SA 
consisting of representatives of the CNDD, FNL and Government (Daley, 2007, p. 214). 
Oleynik et al (2005, p. 232) notes that whilst some participants viewed the involvement 
of South Africa as beneficial as it would ensure the inclusion of a “neutral” player and 
assist in it accessing economic markets (trade), others (including Tutsi’s) feared the 
imposition of democracy through principles of majority rule. Some actors questioned the 
“neutrality and even-handedness” and also accused SA of having a “Government-
centric bias” (Landsberg, n.d).  
De Rouen et al (2010, pp. 341, 343) argue that Burundi was a low capacity state where 
the state was unable to “sustain its autonomy over the society” and the numerous peace 
agreements signed in the period of 1989 to 2006 resulted in failure because intervening 
actors were “unable to supplement state capacity”. This observation is relevant in view 
of the fact that the research identifies that the Arusha agreement also relied heavily on 
external actors for its implementation. 
 
The Great Lakes Region and the ICGLR 
Ameir (2008, pp. 89-91) asserts that the conflict directly affected the security, economy 
and development of Tanzania. Tanzania’s participation in the peace process was 
therefore informed by humanitarian obligations, securing of national interests and the 
need to “preserve and continue with its influence in the sub-region”. 
During the term of Nyerere, the peace negotiations were personalised around his 
leadership (Ameir, 2008, p. 75; Oleynik, Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005, p. 228). On 
his death in 1999, President Museveni of Uganda took over the peace process whilst 
the United Nations dispatched an envoy to identify a replacement. Museveni was later 
replaced by Mandela after the intervention of other UN member states (Oleynik, 
Alexander, & Cherepanya, 2005, p. 228).  
Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, initially 
constituted the regional initiative founded on enhancing regional “political co-operation” 
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and solving regional “problems without the help of outsiders” (Oleynik, Alexander, & 
Cherepanya, 2005, pp. 229-230). Zambia and South Africa subsequently joined the 
regional initiative (Ameir, 2008, p. 78). The regional leaders viewed the peace process17 
as territorial and argued that the Burundi peace challenges would be solved within that 
context hence their initial resistance to the appointment of Mandela (Oleynik, Alexander, 
& Cherepanya, 2005, p. 228). Ameir (2008, p. 84) notes that act of transferring talks to 
Pretoria further increased this resentment as they perceived it as a mode of usurping 
the regional role in the process and of South Africa attempting to penetrate the region. 
 
The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), first established in 
2004, includes regional countries of; Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia. It is a creation of the AU and UN and is geared towards 
addressing challenges faced by countries affected by the conflict in the region (Murithi, 
2005, p. 94). It is evident that the interests of the individual countries are also varied. Of 
note too is that it also includes countries found in other AU REC’s. The configuration of 
this institution could pose an overlap of not only country interests and influences but 
also those of other AU RECs. 
 
Other actors 
Envoys from the EU, USA, Canada, OAU, Sant’Egido and UN were involved in the 
Arusha 1 talks (Daley, 2007, p. 211). According to Daley (2007, p. 213), these actors 
sought to control the work of the thematic committees and the decision making 
processes of the mediators e.g. whilst Mandela had made an undertaking that draft 
agreements would not be amended, the contrary occurred after pressure from Belgium, 
which resulted in one of the protocols being amended. Daley (2007, p. 213) further 
notes that this occurred even though Burundi actors had refused to accept the 
suggested amendments and Mandela unilaterally proceeded and based his decision on 
the need to secure future Belgian funding for the country. 
Contestation for influence by different actors is also considered by Daley’s illustration of 
how, after the 1996 second coup by President Buyoya, different actors expressed 
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different views. African countries rejected Buyoya whilst western countries, international 
NGO’s and the USA supported his resumption of presidency. The different interests and 
motives for involvement in the Burundi peace mission by the different parties confirms 
the findings of Zartman & Touval (2007, pp. 442-443) when noting that different actors 
use a cost and benefit analysis to determine their involvement in the peace process and 
also aspire to influence the outcome of the process. The cost and benefit of the actors 
included the advancement of their own foreign policy norms and agendas, protection 
and addressing of domestic pressures e.g. spill over effects of conflict, utilizing the 
mediation to domestically and internationally build political profiles and influences for 
individuals and their Governments. Zartman & Touval (2007) note that the balancing act 
also affects the primary actors in the conflict e.g. their interests in accepting the 
mediation and peace processes differ and includes acts of balancing results of 
continuing in the conflict, or being party to the conclusion of the conflict, and the 
possibility that the outcome of the process would benefit or disadvantage parties. 
 
 Conclusion 3.6
 
The root causes of the Burundi conflict were informed by factors of colonialism, weak 
institutions which resulted in horizontal inequalities and provided reasons for group 
motivation, and the fight for access to power by the two dominant ethnic groups. The 
agreement rightfully identifies the root causes. However its attendance to the issue of 
weak institutions was not sufficient and this weakness found itself in future 
peacebuilding institutions. The framing of the peace agreement also placed a heavy 
burden on the Burundi actors who lacked the capacity to act. This act ensured that 
implementation was dependent on external actors whose commitment was also 
dependent on their own national interests. The actors as illustrated were varied and 
found in different institutions and sometime even duplicating their presence in some e.g.  
ICGLR members are from different AU RECs and would therefore represent different 
interests and result in the formation of different coalitions  
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Apart from coalitions and their interests, the contents of the agreement also raised 
deficiencies of context, capacity and commitment on implementation of Burundi 
peacebuilding activities. 
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 Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Interpretation 4
 
 Introduction 4.1
 
The chapter presents and interprets data collected from eight respondents                   
(Annexure 4). The list includes two security experts who are former employees of 
Government and were at some point directly involved in the Burundi peace process. 
One respondent represents civil society and the other five are Government officials. The 
interview questions provide insight into the primary and secondary research questions. 
To achieve this, the questions address issues related to the 5-C protocols                    
(content, context, capacity, commitment, client and other coalition support or non-
support). Through interviews, respondents provide insight into their understanding of the 
peace building policy, its requirements, institutions, objectives and links between 
addressing of root causes and activities, direct and indirect influences affecting 
implementation and possible institutional reforms.  
The 5-C protocol, introduced by Brynard & de Coning (2006), is used to interpret the 
data. The authors indicate the inter-connectivity of variables of clients and coalitions, 
capacity, context, commitment and content. In some instances the interconnectivity 
results in some data being scrutinized through one or more aspects of the 5-C 
protocols. 
 
 Data Presentation 4.2
 
 SA Burundi Agreements  4.2.1
 
On 16 September 2007, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, N.C. Zuma, signed a general 
cooperation agreement with Burundi. Article 1 of the agreement lists areas of sectorial 
cooperation in the fields of education, science, health, agriculture, information and 
communication, construction, financial services, trade and investment. Five national 
departments gave effect to the 2007 agreement. The Department of Health concluded 
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its agreement on 16 September 2008 whilst Departments of Higher Education, 
Agriculture, Sports and Recreation, Trade and Industry signed on 11 August 2011. The 
list of agreements signed between RSA and Burundi in pursuance of the general 
cooperation agreement is attached as annexure 1. 
Randomly chosen state actors not identified within the eight respondents of the study 
i.e. Rural Development and Land Reform, Communications, Justice and Constitutional 
Development and the Human Rights Commission had no MOUs with Burundi. The 
institutions indicated that they had also not provided direct assistance to Burundi.  
 
 Root causes 4.2.2
 
Respondents were questioned on whether or not they interrogated root causes of 
conflict prior to engagement in peace missions. Respondents were also requested to 
identify the root causes of the Burundi 1993 conflict. The question aimed at gauging 
whether or not the respondents understood the link between national departments’ 
mandate and implementation of the policy and understood that, according to the policy, 
peace building activities should be aimed at addressing root causes and not symptoms 
of conflict. 
 
Understanding the nature of root causes  
Respondents 1, 2, 3 and 5 positively confirmed having officially interrogated the root 
causes of the conflict. Respondents 7 indicated that, although not having officially 
discussed the root causes, had instead given consideration to these. Respondents 4, 6 
and 8 had not personally or officially interrogated the issue. 
Respondent 1 states that "SA politicians involved in the peace process understood and 
addressed root causes” and “in Burundi this was supported by the role politicians played 
in the finalization of the Arusha agreement … which addressed concerns of ethnic 
minority and dominant majority through power sharing”. According to the respondent, 
“the agreement ensured that there was representativeness in all structures of 
Government including the armed forces”. Respondent 2 identifies that “politicians 
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engineered ethnicity tensions” and the “effect of ethnicity reflected itself in institutions 
and in all aspects of the society e.g. industry, army etc. hence coinage of the term Tutsi 
oligarchy. The conflict was rooted in Belgians empowering minority Tutsis and this led to 
their domination especially militarily”. Respondent 2 also states that “that exclusionary 
and unrepresentative politics informed the conflict and that the exclusionary policies 
were directed to ethnic and gender differentiation”. The Respondent further states that 
“the constitution of Burundi addresses question of root causes in terms of its demands 
of enshrining quotas”. According to the respondent, “the quota percentages were 
directed to ensuring inclusion of all instead of exclusion of some based on gender and 
ethnicity”. 
Respondent 3 indicates that “most conflicts are informed by failure of those in power to 
meet the needs of people… which can be personal and for women these are usually not 
in their hands”. “Peace,” according to the respondent, “only exists if there is adequate 
development”. The respondent also asserts that “in Burundi ethnicity was an issue as it 
determined how people felt about themselves and their looks (Hutu and Tutsi)”. Lastly, 
the respondent indicates that “inadequate early warning systems failed to inform on the 
needs of the people”.  
Respondent 5 states that “the ethnic conflict was initially informed by unfair distribution 
of resources between Hutu, Twa and Tutsis”. Secondly, the respondent states that the 
“French played a role that escalated the conflict” and lastly that “the regional conflict in 
Rwanda and DRC also contributed”. 
Respondent 4 acknowledges “having not interrogated the issues” whilst respondent 6 
states “lack of background information on the matter”. Respondent 8 states that “ARF 
does not concern itself with root causes of the conflict but instead focuses on requests 
of different departments”. 
Respondent 7 indicates “gaining knowledge on the issue for personal development”. 
This respondent identifies that “colonialism sowed divisions among the different ethnic 
groups” and that “competition for scarce resources and unequal treatment and 
suppression of others led to ethnic tensions”.  
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 SA’s motives and interests for participation in the Burundi peace process 4.2.3
 
The questions sought to understand South Africa’s motives and objectives for 
participation in the Burundi peace process and peace missions generally. It also sought 
to understand whether the respondents understood SA’s foreign policy and its links to 
the implementation of the policy. The respondents were also expected to provide an 
opinion assessing whether or not the objectives of SA foreign policy were achieved in 
the Burundi mission. 
 
Respondents 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 provided feedback. Respondents 4 had no inputs. 
Respondent 4 states “lack of knowledge” and “having not paid attention to the question”. 
Respondent 1 indicates that SA peace missions are informed by considerations of 
“humanitarian, human rights and security issues”. Respondent 2 also states that “SA 
involvement was driven by its own foreign policy of wanting to ensure the creation of a 
better and secure world, a conscious decision to contribute in the negotiations of other 
countries and thereby assist them to settle problems in an amicable manner.” 
Respondent 2 also identifies that SA participated because “it wanted to ensure stability 
in Africa which would result in the reduction of refugees and immigrants influx”, 
“expansion for economic and trade benefits” and the “presence of realisation that failed 
states in the north would have an adverse effect on the economy of SA”. In the Burundi 
mission respondent 2 states that there “was also awareness that deploying SA troops in 
the DRC could not succeed if there was a failed state in Burundi”. 
Respondent 2 also indicates that SA intervened because of “requests from third 
parties”. According to the same respondent, the requests were from “President Nyerere, 
President Salim Ahmed Salim Salim and Hutu political leaders who had always said 
there was a form of apartheid dimension in their society and therefore wanted to learn 
from SA experiences”. Respondent 2 denies that “SA intervened for economic inroads 
and political influence (stature) into the Great Lakes” and states that “it was never a 
consideration. Economic inroads only became a factor when the Burundi Government 
and other countries in that region requested to forge economic ties with SA”. 
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Respondent 3 states that “participation is informed by SA philosophy of taking care of its 
neighbours”. Respondent 5 also “dismisses the notion that SA wanted to use Burundi to 
gain international stature” and states that “SA did not need Burundi for that because it 
had already established its own stature through resolving its own problems without 
external intervention”. Respondent 5 states that “SA entered the fray because of 
requests from Burundi and not for political and economic reasons as the country is poor 
and does not have much to offer RSA”. Respondent 5 identifies the “humanitarian angle 
aimed at protecting returnees” and “troops were sent to provide VIP training, provide 
VIP support to politicians and protect the assets of RSA”. Respondent 6 states that 
“DIRCO is guided by Ubuntu principles”.  
Respondent 7 states that “President Mbeki was the pioneer of a secure Africa and the 
African Renaissance and NEPAD programs were identified as important for driving 
peace in Africa. Secondly, during that period there was a morality and leadership gap in 
the continent and Burundi provided an opportunity for SA to make its mark in 
international relations”. Respondent 7 also comments that “there was an understanding 
that peace in the continent could curb the influx of migrants to SA” and lastly that 
“participation was informed by requests of other countries”. 
 
 Activities 4.2.4
 
The questions determined activities undertaken by different SA actors in Burundi. The 
questions also established whether the activities targeted the root causes and motives 
of intervention.  
Respondents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, provided inputs on the questions. Respondent 6, 8 could not 
provide inputs. Respondent 7 based information on knowledge gained on SA post 
conflict activities in the region. The three 6, 7 and 8 can be identified as having no direct 
knowledge about the question. 
Respondent 6 indicates an “inability to answer the question due to lack of information”. 
Respondent 7 indicates a “lack of knowledge on any Burundi activities involving 
educational matters” but notes “that the department had facilitated training courses in 
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SA for other citizens of the Great Lakes region”. Respondent 8 indicates that “according 
to personal knowledge, ARF did not fund any peacebuilding activities in Burundi”. 
Respondent 1 observes that in “civilian peacebuilding, PALAMA played a major role in 
the training of Burundi civil servants”. The respondent (1) notes that “projects and 
activities of other departments could not continue because SA’s presence in Burundi 
became unpopular after SA’s insistence on the inclusion of Paliphetu-FNL led by 
Agathon Rwasa movement in the peace agreement”. According to the respondent, 
“South African departments were then faced with a hostile environment”. 
Respondent 2 indicates that “ACCORD assisted the Burundi Government and provided 
training on land issues, evaluation mechanisms to monitor ethnic and gender issues 
and PALAMA had projects for training civil servants”. Respondent 3 states that 
“Government, parastatals [state owned entities] and private sector funded SAWID 
programs directed towards gender issues of Burundi. The program involved 
engagement of women through dialogue to share experiences and skills”. Respondent 5 
identifies that “ACCORD’s projects were designed to train on negotiation and 
reconciliation skills so parties could address issues of conflict”. The respondent (5) 
indicates that “SAWID’s projects assisted in social cohesion and reduction [of] poverty 
issues”. 
Respondent 4 states that “in 2008 [a third country] through its reconstruction capacity 
development program entered into a trilateral agreement with SA for a period of five 
years where SA would act as an implementing partner and train civil servants of 
Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan. Outputs of the capacity development program focus on 
promotion of service delivery and are informed by AU and NEPAD obligations”. 
Respondent 5 notes that “whilst DIRCO was not directly involved in projects it initiated a 
study where different departments determined areas of possible assistance i.e. 
research on how different departments could assist and these involved University of 
South Africa, African Development Bank, Transnet, and Agriculture. Reports were 
consequently compiled for principals although there was no action thereafter”. 
Respondent 1, 2 5 provided insight on this. Respondent 1 cites reasons of how SA 
became “unpopular”, respondent 2 states that “the SA mission was neglected for a long 
time” and respondent 5 observes that “South African Government tends to tackle 
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symptoms and not root causes of conflicts and DIRCO is not structurally geared 
towards addressing root causes”. 
 
 Policy knowledge  4.2.5
 
The section assesses knowledge and understanding of the policy by implementers. The 
questions on the resource bank below were used to assess understanding on internal 
and external issues that could affect successful implementation and also provide insight 
on the content of the policy. 
Respondents 1, 2 and 6 indicate having read the policy whilst 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 stated 
otherwise. On their understanding of the policy, respondent 1 states that “when the 
white paper was drafted SA lacked experience in peace keeping and consequently 
there is no coherence between structure and objectives. It therefore has institutional 
design flaws and focuses on mandate issues instead of practicalities e.g. there is poor 
institutional coordination during peace missions”. The respondent added that a “review 
of the policy is long overdue as it needs to be operationalized in its design to address 
structural weaknesses”. 
Respondent 2 indicates that “the white paper informs on the mandate of different 
departments involved in peace mission”. Respondent 6 adds that “the policy is sufficient 
and challenges are within DIRCO and its capacity to implement”. Respondent 6 further 
states that the “white paper is a good guiding document as it provides clarity on issues 
of mandate, procedures and protects functionaries and those deployed”. The 
respondent 6 concludes by stating that “the policy is a very important instrument that 
informs on who does what, when and how and that problems of implementation are not 
linked to the content of the policy”. 
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Resource Bank provision 
All respondents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 indicated a lack of knowledge on the provision of 
the resource bank.  
Despite their lack of knowledge on the provision, respondents 1, 3, 4 5 and 6 expressed 
their views on the matter. Respondent 1 states that the provision “was similar to the 
outlook of SADC and the AU” and that “implementation would be impractical”. To 
support these assertions, respondent 1 cites the following; “post conflict projects require 
specific experts and NGOs usually have those capabilities hence NGOs are usually 
hired as implementing partners; persons in the data (especially civil servants) usually 
lack an understanding of UN rules and procedures especially those related to 
procurement and therefore whilst competent in the requirement of the national countries 
may lack such competency in inter-Governmental organizations. Due to this, adverts for 
recruiting members into peace missions are usually placed in the public domain”. The 
respondent provides an example noting that “even the AU failed to implement and use 
its data base and resorted to placement adverts for the recent 2013 Mali mission 
(MINUSMA)”. The respondent also clarifies the issue that “competency should be 
considered at different levels e.g. financial experts might lack language requirements of 
peace missions therefore an accountant from SA might not possess Arabic or French 
needed for a specific mission”. Lastly, the respondent (1) notes that “whilst persons may 
be in the data base they may lack willingness to deploy during certain periods”. 
Respondent 1 suggests that “South Africa should build experience and find 
mechanisms of teaching people to get employment at inter-Governmental organisations 
from lower ladders so as to gain experience and understanding of the operational 
issues of those systems”.  
Respondent 3 “supports the approach as a good network system”. Respondent 4 states 
that “the department had not utilised the resource bank mechanisms and had instead 
employed persons on the ground for project implementation”. On being questioned why 
they opted for this approach, respondent 4 indicates the following challenges with 
regard to employing South Africans to run the projects; “SA’s lack of understanding of 
local dynamics in countries being assisted, the need for dedicated persons on the 
ground who could manage the project locally instead of distant management, language 
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proficiency shortcomings of South African personnel and the need for buy-in by local 
players to the program which could be better attained by people familiar with the 
terrain”. 
Respondent 5 states that “the DIRCO placement of people in peace missions is ad hoc 
process”. Respondent 6 states that, “having a list of names would be problematic as 
funding and availability of trained personnel would not be guaranteed”. 
 
 Institutions 4.2.6
 
The questions focused on peacebuilding institutions at national and international level 
and their influence on implementation of the policy. The questions sought to understand 
whether or not respondents understood the link between national and international 
institutions involved in peace building. 
 National institutions 4.2.6.1
NOCPM 
Respondent 3, 4 and 7 indicated their lack of knowledge of the NOCPM and its 
functions.  
Respondents 1, 2, 5 and 6 provided observations on the weaknesses confronting the 
NOCPM. Respondent 1 states that the “NOCPM has been dysfunctional for many years 
as it fails to execute its primary function of acting as nodal point in the coordination of 
departmental peace mission activities.” The same respondent identifies various reasons 
to support the assertion; “it is not the first point of entry for requests and Government 
departmental plans for peace missions e.g. defence in the past received direct 
instructions from the presidency to act on certain missions, it lacks assessment and 
analysis capacity and cannot provide principals with different options, it plays the role of 
a postal box and acts as a conduit of information between DIRCO and other 
departments, it lacks the capacity to coordinate activities between departments, 
meetings are an information sharing session. Due to its structural design it has poor 
decision making capacity e.g. departmental representatives are at low levels (Lt 
Colonel, Deputy Directors etc.) who consequently listen and report to their superiors, 
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and secondly, the unit is headed by a director not regarded as a serious decision maker 
in peace mission issues”. The respondent (1) finally notes that “the structure is more 
informed by politics and lacks leadership and direction”18. 
Respondent 2 states that “the NOCPM looks good on research but has operationally 
failed due to certain constraints i.e. coordination is negatively affected by its level of 
authority and mandate therefore decisions are taken at higher and different levels 
without engagement with the NOCPM”. According to the respondent “these issues 
create disjuncture in the NOCPM”. 
Respondent 5 notes that “power relations and dynamics of higher authorities determine 
issues and therefore the NOCPM ends playing a facilitating role”. Respondent 6 
indicates that the “NOCPM advises and coordinates activities but cannot decide on 
actions of departments e.g. drafting and contents of MOUs”. 
 
Funding and ARF  
Respondents 3, 4, 5, 6 7 and 8 commented on the funding of peace missions. 
Respondent 3 indicates that “funding from ARF may suffer as party and Government 
politics affect relationships of Government and civil society e.g. after President Mbeki 
lost leadership of the ruling party SAWID’s plans of developing early warning systems 
were terminated in 2008”. Secondly, the respondent (3) states that “Treasury is not 
geared towards addressing issues of development and poverty. Instead it focuses on 
figures and balancing of books at the expense of human issues”. The respondent (3) 
suggests that “the involvement of civil society in the work of Treasury could remedy the 
challenge”. 
Respondent 4 notes that “since timelines and accounting systems differ between 
countries e.g. budget cycle there is a constant challenge of compliance as some 
recipient countries lack understanding of SA rigid systems established by the Treasury 
Department”. 
Respondent 5 states that the “financial accounting systems of ARF are not practical in 
some post conflict settings e.g. Burundi was a cash economy after the conflict and, 
although funds were available for projects, there were no internal structures in Burundi 
that could receive the money. SA Government could not therefore transfer money as 
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Treasury and the Public Finance and Management Act (1 of 1999) (PFMA) 
requirements could not be satisfied. SA policies were therefore not aligned to the 
practicalities on the ground”. 
Respondent 6 states that “ARF concerns itself with practical implementation of projects. 
On presentation of project proposals, ARF demands detailed answers on the 
achievement of outcomes at different levels of the project”. The respondent also states 
that “the ARF panel has stringent requirements and hold their ground when approving 
funding and demand a high level of monitoring expenditure”. 
Respondent 7 observes that “DIRCO dictates programs for departments to implement 
and fails to commit funds for those programs. DIRCO programs are therefore not 
aligned to departmental programs and plans”. According to the respondent, “the 
arrangement results in planning without budgets, and on numerous occasions, 
departments have had to source funding from third parties (trilateral arrangements)”. 
The respondent also notes that “ARF has its own demands on departments and 
implementation of projects therefore securing funds from that source is a drawn out 
process”. 
Respondent 8 indicates that “the current mandate of the ARF is implementable and 
there are adequate systems for implementation of mandate”. According to the 
respondent “ARF has never rejected projects because of lack of funds instead rejection 
has been mainly attributed to non-compliance with requirements of ARF”. The 
respondent indicates that “ARF maintains a data base used to monitor, evaluate and 
track progress of programs until finalisation. ARF focuses on compliance to RSA 
systems of accountability as enshrined in the PFMA and supply management 
prescripts”. The respondent further states that “the relevant desk has oversight on the 
implementation of the project” and that “ARF requires that budget allocation must talk to 
project implementation”. 
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 International institutions 4.2.6.2
 
Respondent 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 acknowledged a lack of understanding of UN and AU 
peacebuilding institutions.  
Respondent 1, 2 and 5 had practical experience in these institutions and provided the 
following observations. 
 
UNPBC 
Respondent 1 notes challenges of the PBC and states that “funds and projects are 
aimed at ensuring the entrenchment of democracy and therefore do not have a holistic 
approach, the PBC fails to create synergy among actors since different actors pursue 
their own agenda at the exclusion of the PBC e.g. activities of bilateral arrangements do 
not align themselves to the agenda of the PBC and the PBC works with regional 
organizations instead of individual countries”. 
According to respondent 2 “the main weakness of peacebuilding is found within the 
PBC and its lack of resources”. The respondent (2) also states that “this weakness is 
informed by decisions initially taken at its inception that the PBC would use its existing 
resources (which were absent) and that the PBC would be financed through voluntary 
contributions”. Respondent 2 asserts that this “led to uncertainty because individual 
actors were funding projects on the ground and yet also expected to fund projects 
through the PBC”. In addition to issues of resources respondent 2 indicates that “the 
UNSC’s insistence of its inclusion in the PBC became problematic in practice because it 
establishes an obligation on the PBC to have two lines of reporting on peacebuilding 
matters e.g. BINUB continues to report to the DPKO as if it is part of that structure”. 
Respondent 5 indicates that “internationally the PBC is part of the ICGLR and this is 
problematic since the ICGLR has expanded its mandate to such an extent that it no 
longer focuses on traditional peace and security issues after conflict. There is now a 
lack of direction as their agenda now includes social issues e.g. HIV, poverty, and 
humanitarian issues”. The respondent (5) also notes that “another problem is that 
security issues of the Great Lakes cannot be divorced therefore any credible 
peacebuilding strategy must simultaneously address issues of the DRC, Burundi and 
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Rwanda”. Respondent 2 also finds the need for better coordination between ICGLR and 
East African Community and states that “if these are coordinated and streamlined it 
could ensure a better Burundi. Burundi has to be better integrated into the East African 
Community and they must be treated as equal partners”. 
 
AU and SADC 
Respondent 1 addresses issues of SADC and the AU and states that the “SADC REC 
“has limited knowledge and capacity for involvement in peacebuilding activities” and 
also notes that “the REC’s lack of funding also affects implementation of policies”. 
 
Donors and their interests 
Respondents 2, 4, 5 and 6 commented on the issue of how donors affect 
implementation of peacebuilding activities. 
Respondent 2 identifies “challenges confronting implementation of the Arusha 
agreement e.g. amnesty provisions are found in the ARUSHA agreement yet UN 
structures demand that the UN tribunal should be used to determine issues of 
immunity”. This respondent (2) states that “this is the opposite of the will of the Burundi 
people and as a result the TRC process has been delayed”. Respondent 2 also 
identifies a challenge of “Burundi and donor collusion with insistence that new 
negotiations should be held for those initially excluded from the 2000 Arusha 
agreement”. 
Respondent 4 observes that “at the UN different states have different interests and in 
order to advance their interests major powers bully smaller states and therefore major 
external powers direct programs to suit their own interests”. Respondent 6 notes that 
“the influence of external third forces might be strong and play a bigger detrimental role 
in the goal of achieving peace in post conflict societies”. 
Respondent 5 notes that ‘the UN system is not result orientated since their HQ 
produces numerous resolutions that have no effect on the ground and in the UN field 
and its agencies hold various coordinating meetings instead of implementing their 
mandates”. 
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 Other issues 4.2.7
 
Unsustainability of projects 
Respondents 4, 5, and 7 indicated a donor dependency relationship exhibited by some 
recipient countries. 
Respondent 4 indicates that recipients “lack initiatives and tend to develop a 
dependency syndrome. Instead of independently managing projects they constantly 
seek guidance and funding”. Respondent 5 states that “although there is political will to 
peacebuilding there is no support to sustain it” and indicates that to “most countries 
seem to be focused on receiving funding than in initiating their own projects and SA 
should adopt an approach that teaches them how to fish”. 
Respondent 6 observes “the commitment of implementer’s is not questionable”. 
Respondent 7 notes that “SA mainly focuses on security sector issues in conflict 
management and other departments enter the fray at later stages”. Respondent 7 also 
observes that “institutions created by SA crumble after departure of SA implementers as 
there is lack of political will and lack of ownership on the part of receiving countries”. 
Respondent 8 states that “SA (Government and desks) cannot shoulder the blame for 
failure of projects in those countries as the beneficiaries should manage their own 
projects”. 
 
Communication 
Respondent 2, 3, and 4 made observations on communication challenges. 
Respondent 4 notes that receiving countries have “poor infrastructure e.g. the lack of 
reliable internet, in post conflict countries render communication and project 
management difficult”. Respondent 2 identifies the “need for Government to have 
outreach programs and educate people about its policies including peace missions”. 
The respondent (2) also notes that “due to weak Government communication systems 
other actors occupy the gap for their own interests”. Respondent 3 notes that 
“Government systems do not have structures that coordinate and transmit policies 
consequently there is no knowledge of the peace mission policy”. 
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Control systems and corruption 
Respondent 7 and 8 indicated challenges related to lack of controls and corruption in 
societies emerging from conflict.  
Respondent 7 provides general observations on peacebuilding activities in different 
countries and states that “certain events demotivate SA officials”. The respondent 
provides examples of “disappearance of donated equipment, scholarships provided for 
the general population were allocated to associates of those in power and recipients 
brought to study in SA would neglect their academic obligations and on arrival, those 
that completed studies relocated to third countries instead of benefitting countries of 
origin”. Respondent 8 notes the “existence of practises alien to SA officials. This 
includes beneficiaries requesting permission to divert funds and use them for 
unbudgeted items and projects” and that “ARF systems prevent unlawful diversion of 
funds”. 
 
Capacity and coordination 
Respondents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 identified challenges of capacity and coordination at 
different levels.  
Respondent 1 indicates a “general presence of poor coordination in SA institutions 
during peace missions”. Respondent 2 states that “the main weakness is DIRCO, its 
desks and its missions”. Respondent 3 also notes that “there is lack of coordination in 
peacebuilding activities”. Respondent 4 notes that “DIRCO fails to coordinate training 
outputs of different departments”.  
Respondent 6 negates the notion of lack of coordination and states that “there is 
coordination as the NOCPM holds regular meetings to consult and share information on 
issues” and further notes that “these meetings are important for understanding 
challenges”. 
Respondent 3 indicates that “Government has no department responsible for pooling of 
information and a central place for storage of information. Consequently it is difficult to 
find nodal points”. Respondent 4 states that the “lack of coordination is indicated by the 
fact that there is no central data base at DIRCO which records efforts of different 
departments”. On being questioned about this challenge, respondent 6 indicates that 
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“there is no lack of the information as DIRCO compiles country reports which are found 
in DIRCO archives”. 
At a regional level, respondent 2 observes that “better coordination of ICGLR and East 
African Community could ensure a better Burundi” and that “Burundi needs to be 
integrated into the East African community and also be treated as equal partners”. 
Respondent 5 notes a “lack of coordination between different actors involved in peace 
missions”. 
Respondent 2 states that the “capacity of DIRCO is limited and given this adherence to 
commitment is always going to be a challenge” and points out that “SA should rethink 
how it addresses issues of too many commitments in different forums as this places a 
strain on implementation”. Respondent 5, in addition, states that “DIRCO seems to be 
doing a lot of things at once and then loses focus on some projects”. 
Respondent 2 notes “disjuncture and lack of coordination of agreements due to the 
absence of program coordination, un-streamlined activities and over stretched capacity 
of DIRCO functionaries since they have to implement a wide range of agreements”. The 
respondent (2) suggests that “DIRCO should operate on a project management basis”. 
Respondent 4 states that “DIRCO has not structured itself to evaluate and monitor 
projects and different MOUs”. Respondent 5 indicates that “there is no follow up on 
designed projects as there is no proper planning … projects and activities are taken on 
ad hoc basis”.  
 
Political context 
Respondent 2 indicates that “structures in Burundi cannot implement policies due to the 
high turnover of political heads which affect continuity” and that “in Burundi SA failed to 
reap the benefits of its investment due to political changes within SA Government, lack 
of structured consistency and engagement, and neglect of adequately staffing 
missions”. 
Respondent 3 indicates “numerous problems between Government and civil society 
which culminated in the termination of peacebuilding activities in Burundi. The first 
relates to ARF and Government politics, e.g. the partnership between DFA and SAWID 
fell apart when champions of SAWID within the DFA were deployed on external 
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postings and post 2009, new political actors and other civil society groups entered the 
space previously occupied by SAWID”. 
Respondent 6 notes that the “breaking of political links has an impact on continuity of 
projects on the ground”. Respondent 7 indicates that “the reconfiguration of 
Government departments in 2009 affected existing programs. Resources of old 
departments had to be shared with new departments and in that process some 
programs of action were left unattended”. 
Respondent 3 notes that “civil servants exit with their knowledge and departments lack 
systems of recording that knowledge”. Respondent 6 attributes the “lack of continuity in 
DIRCO projects to the dynamic nature of the organisation as there is high personnel 
rotation in different directorates thus affecting institutional memory of different internal 
structures”. 
 
Decision making 
Respondent 3, 4, 5, 6 pointed out that policy issues are controlled by the top structure of 
Government.  
Respondent 3 indicates that “the lessons learnt over the years include the observation 
that political patronage determine activities undertaken and affect funding of projects. 
Secondly political personalities play a crucial role in the execution of activities since 
elected officials are powerful and there is no filtering of their exercise of their 
discretionary powers”. 
Respondent 4 indicates that “the management and direction in policy administration is 
top down as departments act on agreements signed by the executive (presidency and 
relevant minister). The function of the department is to implement decisions reached by 
the executive”. When questioned about whether this system was the best and if the 
recipient country’s motives for requesting certain projects were not questioned the 
respondent 4 states that “departmental functionaries concern themselves with issues of 
legality at international and national level. The request must be acceptable at UN, UN or 
SADC levels and the function must fall within the mandate of the implementing 
department”. The respondent states that “officials cannot influence the choice of 
activities in peacebuilding as requirements are from top down”. 
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Respondent 6 indicates that “ownership of the process by lower levels of the 
bureaucracy is limited”. Respondent 7 notes that “the top down implementation model 
has an emphasis on supporting peace through security sector measures instead of 
involving civilian departments” and that “officials are confined in their work as perimeters 
are outlined by their scope of work. Officials in the different sectors are not expected to 
consider issues of root causes nor are they allowed to place concerns of root causes 
into the mandate of the department. In reality officials only work towards what is 
delegated to them by the executive”. 
Respondent 5 further indicates that “the executive ignores advice from officials and 
continue with their own projects and programs of action and this tendency leads to 
policy failure”. Respondent 6 notes that “the problem may lie with principals relying on 
numerous consultants and therefore having difficulty in sifting through different 
messages received”.  
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 Data interpretation on 5-C protocol 4.3
 Introduction 4.3.1
The 5-C protocol is used to analyse data collected. The 5-C protocols entail variables 
of; clients and coalitions, capacity, context, commitment and content (Brynard & de 
Coning, 2006) and discussed in detail in chapter one. 
 
 Discussion 4.3.2
 
 Clients and coalitions 4.3.2.1
 
Chapter two’s discussion on peacebuilding institutions identified how Kumar (2001) and 
Cousens (2001) advise policymakers to map and analyse actors involved in peace 
missions. According to the authors, the exercise reveals true motives for participation in 
peace initiatives and therefore assists in identification of possible coalition partners, an 
issue regarded as beneficial by the policy. Brynard & de Coning (2006, p. 203) also 
support this outlook and urge implementers to “identify key relevant stakeholders” who 
would “support a particular implementation process”.  
Brown (2007, p. 40) in chapter one also argued that, in the security field, effective policy 
makers must adopt a strategy of engaging other international actors, a fact also 
advocated by the policy which provides that South Africa cannot, in third countries, 
secure peace on its own and adopts the stance of collaboration with “coalition of the 
willing” (1999, p. 19).  
In addition, Spillane et al (2002) in chapter one, also brought attention to the fact that 
implementation requires cooperation between agent and principal as the principal 
(decision makers) requires assistance of the agent to ensure the carrying out of the 
decision.  
The above literature informs the research of the importance of collaboration between 
actors in implementation of the policy and therefore the need to map and identify 
coalition actors. It is further argued that the exercise provides policymakers with a risk 
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assessment tool that would enable SA to determine actors that would impede or 
facilitate implementation of the policy. 
The data collected suggests, however, that SA executive policy makers and 
bureaucrats do not sufficiently engage, map, and analyse key actors found at different 
levels of implementation (Government, recipient country and international institutions). 
Secondly, it’s observed that SA bureaucrats play a minimal role in decision making 
processes that inform the identification of possible coalition partners. Thirdly the advice 
of Spillane et al (2002) seems to be overlooked as the principal and agents (executive 
and bureaucrats) fail to realise their connectivity in implementation. The data also 
indicates that in Burundi, SA neglected to utilise its pivotal role of facilitator to mobilise 
and strategically co-opt other external and civil society actors to support its 
peacebuilding activities. Supporting data for these observations is discussed below. 
 
Executive 
The DIRCO executive failed to co-opt and ensure that other national departments 
timeously implemented DIRCO commitments undertaken in the 2007 general 
cooperation agreement. Some sectors have still (2013) not signed any sectorial 
agreements. One department signed in 2008 and five others in 2011. 
The omission or delay in signing suggests one of the following possible explanations; 
the different departments either did not view themselves as DIRCO implementation 
partners, or that DIRCO committed them to programs that did not fall within their own 
departmental planning, or that the departments lacked the capacity to ensure 
implementation of DIRCO’s commitments. 
Respondents 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 provided a range of different motives for SA intervention 
in Burundi. The motives listed varied from economic, political and even moral 
considerations, whilst respondent 4 did not consider it necessary to pay attention to the 
question. Apart from respondent 2, 5, 7, the other respondents related their opinions on 
the general SA foreign relations policies. The responses indicate DIRCO’s lapse in 
communication i.e. did not sufficiently communicate and bring on board implementers to 
the specific motive for that peacebuilding mission.  
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Respondent 7 observed that the executive viewed SA civilian activities as secondary 
and not the priority for peace missions and that the security sector was identified by the 
executive as being the primary one. The statement could provide insight on how DIRCO 
and the executive neglected to ensure “buy” in from SA civilian actors.  
 
Bureaucrats 
Rrespondents 4, 6, 7, 8 professed not having officially interrogated the root causes of 
the conflict as they viewed this exercise as not being part of their mandate. This is 
despite their mandate to implement a policy that requires attendance to root causes of 
the conflict, as opposed to symptoms. 
Rrespondents 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 provide insight on how they viewed the relationship between 
bureaucrats and the executive observing that the former possessed limited decision 
making influence on implementation of the policy.  
 
SA actors outside government  
The ability of SA departmental actors to form coalitions with other SA actors outside 
Government also posed challenges. Respondents 2, 3, 6 observed how the introduction 
of new SA executive members of Government affected the direction and support of 
existing DIRCO peacebuilding activities as new political entrants identified new coalition 
partners and terminated contact with previous ones. It is therefore observed that 
choices of coalition partners, outside Government, are not necessarily informed through 
analysis and mapping of common interests but through personal preferences of the 
executive. 
 
Barundi actors  
SA and Barundi actors’ relationships also exhibit signs of lack of communication and 
expectations on end state objectives for SA’s intervention. SA activities identified by 
respondents seemed to be limited and confined to coalitions between the two 
Governments and excluded sustained participation between SA Government sponsored 
actors (SAWID and ACCORD) and local civil society actors. There is also no indication 
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of any direct engagement between SA government actors and Burundi civil society 
actors. 
Respondents of 4, 5, 7 indicated a donor dependency relationship exhibited by some 
recipient countries, with respondent 7 observing that “institutions created by SA crumble 
after departure of SA implementers as there is lack of political will, commitment and buy 
in on the part of receiving countries”. Respondent 8 however stated that “SA cannot 
shoulder the blame for failure of projects in those countries as the beneficiaries should 
manage their own projects”. The responses above reflect the possibility of different 
understandings by different actors on the end state objectives of activities, lack of 
sustainability on SA’s approach to its activities and lack of support on SA activities by 
other actors. 
 
International institutions 
Apart from respondents 1, 2, 5, SA actors seemed to lack knowledge of peacebuilding 
institutions found at the international level. The other respondents could not draw a link 
between their mandate, implementation of the policy, international peacebuilding 
institutions and engagement of actors beyond their sector. Data illustrating this is 
informed by the fact that respondents 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, including two from DIRCO structures, 
indicated lack of knowledge on the functions and roles of multilateral peacebuilding 
institutions. It is suggested that this lack of awareness would therefore prevent 
implementers from understanding and identifying threats and opportunities to 
implementation. The actors would therefore be unable to systematically identify 
“coalition of the willing” actors found in international institutions e.g. UN, AU, SADC and 
ICGLR. 
Despite the general oversight on mapping of actors in peace missions, respondents 1, 
2, 4, 5, 6 understand that actors pursue their own national interests in conducting 
international affairs and invariably in peacebuilding activities. 
In conclusion, from the data, it is observed that SA actors do not sufficiently engage in 
the process of identifying the coalition of the willing as envisaged by the policy and this 
weakness is found at all levels. 
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 Capacity 4.3.2.2
 
Brynard & de Coning relate the capacity variable to Government’s ability to “have the 
requisite administrative and other abilities to do the job” (2006, p. 199). Capacity is 
viewed as ranging from “availability of and access to concrete or tangible resources 
(human financial, technology, logistical, etc.) … [to] … intangible requirements of 
leadership, motivation, commitment, willingness, courage, endurance…” (Brynard & de 
Coning, 2006, p. 199).  
The data collected reveals capacity challenges found on issues of leadership, 
knowledge and coordination. The mapping and forming coalitions with other actors, 
discussed above, is an illustration of capacity weakness since it reveals issues of weak 
leadership, ability and motivation from the executive.  
The data collected also suggests high levels of lack of knowledge on the policy and its 
content among implementers at the bureaucratic and street levels. It is observed that 
this lack of knowledge mainly informs this variable of implementation. Support for this is 
gained from the following data. 
Only three respondents 1, 2, 6 of which two were non-Governmental security experts, 
had read the policy whilst 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 had not. It is argued that this lack of knowledge 
affected the capacity of implementers as they were expected to implement a policy 
which they had no knowledge of. Further, the lack of policy knowledge could have led to 
bureaucrats’ failure in linking issues of mandate, activities and requirements of the 
policy. The following is support for this observation. 
Respondents 4, 6, 7, and 8 indicated not having officially interrogated the root causes of 
the conflict and viewed this exercise as not being part of their mandate. Respondents 1, 
2, 3, 5, 7 professed to have (officially and unofficially) interrogated the root causes, but 
their responses indicated general observations on the root causes of the Burundi 
conflict and not the trigger for the 1994 conflict. The Burundi conflict occurred over 
various time frames and intervals. Levy (2007, p. 20) was noted in chapter three for 
advising policy makers to contextualise and explore why conflict occurred at a particular 
period. The lack of appreciation of identifying specifics of cycles of violence could be 
viewed as a lack of understanding of the requirements of the policy and general 
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peacebuilding thinking, i.e. the need to address root causes of conflict instead of 
symptoms and the need to identify causes of conflict in each particular cycle of violence. 
It is further argued that this weakness could result in SA failure to draw “distinction 
between parochial motivations that galvanize … conflicts and the ethnic consequences 
that follow” as previously identified by Brown (2007, p. 47) and others in chapter two.  
Lack of knowledge of the policy could also negatively affect the prioritization and 
identification of SA activities as actors could not have had the capacity to direct their 
activities to the 1994 cycle of violence but to the general root causes of the Burundi 
conflict. 
Of concern was the fact that after identification of the general root causes of the conflict, 
only respondent 5 referred to the Twa dimension and respondents 2, 3 included the 
gender dimension in the exclusionary politics of Burundi. This is despite the inclusion of 
these two categories in the Arusha agreement. It is suggested that the omission or 
oversight of respondents to identify these matters indicates a further lack of appreciation 
on how other peacebuilding tools (Arusha agreement, Strategic Framework and Priority 
Plan) should inform the choice and prioritisation of activities by intervening actors. 
Lack of knowledge also manifested itself on other questions relating to, inter alia, 
specific provisions of the policy, SA motives and interests in intervention, domestic and 
international peacebuilding institutions and finally on peacebuilding activities adopted by 
other SA actors. These are discussed in the variables of content, context and 
commitment.  
In addition data suggests that SA actors’ lack of knowledge on the policy led to SA’s 
failure to undertake risk assessment, beyond that identified in the clients and coalition 
variable. Responses indicate that SA planning neglected to fully appreciate and 
consider characteristics of post conflict societies. As previously discussed in chapter 
one, Ball (1996) cautions intervening actors to consider these when undertaking 
peacebuilding activities and provides insight on the existence of weak public institutions, 
the economy and poor infrastructure. SA actors seem not have fully appreciated these 
in their planning and implementation of the policy. The observation is supported by data 
from respondents 4, 5 who indicated that implementation by SA actors was hampered 
by lack of technological infrastructure (internet, banking systems) and human capacity 
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to implement on the part of recipient countries. According to the respondents these 
affected timelines and funding of projects. The responses indicate SA accounting 
systems as not being in sync with challenges facing post conflict societies and suggest 
the need for SA actors to plan around issues mentioned in Ball’s characteristics and 
realities of each individual post conflict society.  
Apart from the knowledge dimension, challenges of capacity are further identified at the 
practical level of coordination within SA institutions. Respondent 6 observes that 
“challenges are within DIRCO and its capacity to implement”. Respondents 2, 4 
suggested that DIRCO lacked capacity to track and generally monitor its obligations. 
Respondent 2 advised on the need for the RIRCO to adopt a project management 
approach in its planning and execution of its programmes and obligations.  
Respondents also generally observed disjuncture between commitments and execution 
by DIRCO missions, internal structures (NOCPM, ARF) and desks. The following 
supports the statement. 
Respondents 1, 2, 4, 6 further observed that NOCPM weaknesses relate to issues of 
structure, capacity, leadership, analysis, coordination, decision making, authority level 
and power relations. Respondent 1 summarised the capacity challenges of the NOCPM 
and referred to it as a “postal box” that acted as a “conduit” for information between 
DIRCO and other actors. The NOCPM was portrayed as an institution unable to carry 
out its primary mandate of coordinating peace mission activities. Evidence from this was 
illustrated by participants of ARF and NOCPM. The ARF respondent indicated lack of 
knowledge on peacebuilding activities executed outside ARF and NOCPM respondent 
did not possess or have knowledge of activities directly undertaken by the SA 
Government. The responses affirmed observations of respondents 3, 4 who identified 
the need for DIRCO to maintain a central data base on Governmental peacebuilding 
activities. Despite this, respondent 6 dismissed the concern and referred to the 
existence of DIRCO archives. It is suggested that remarks of respondents 3, 4 are valid 
and the existence of such a data base would be informative for DIRCO structures 
(desks, missions and other structures) and other actors and could assist in the 
coordination of activities and knowledge management. 
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Respondents 1, 4 also identified an additional weakness of SA actors to operate within 
international domains. The weaknesses relate to practical issues of SA actors capacity 
to operate in international forums e.g. language barriers and lack understanding of UN 
systems. Apart from highlighting capacity limitations of SA actors to operate in some 
third countries, the responses also discuss factors that could limit SA’s ability to form 
coalitions on the ground, especially local actors. 
It should be noted that the data collected suggests that SA does not lack funds for 
peacebuilding activities and, as respondent 8 remarked, “ARF has never rejected 
projects because of lack of funds instead rejection has been mainly attributed to non-
compliance with requirements of ARF”. In view of these statements it would therefore 
seem that capacity issues of SA in peacebuilding are not informed by lack of funding but 
other considerations. 
 
Burundi and capacity 
Respondent 7, 8 also identified capacity deficits in recipient countries. These relate to 
issues of human capacity and systems capacity. However the discussion informs this 
variable on the need for SA actors to engage and assist recipient countries with 
capacity building activities in governance issues. It is evident that capacity building in 
governance issues would build capacity on accounting, transparency and reduction of 
corrupt activities and therefore ensure that donated materials and benefits are not 
misappropriated and that funding is used for budgeted items. 
 
International institutions and capacity 
International institutions also seem to suffer from capacity problems associated with 
financial and human resource and issues of mandate. Respondent 1, 2, 5 provide 
supporting evidence for this observation. 
Respondent 1 highlighted lack of capacity within the UNPBC. The respondent identified 
lack of funding, proper direction to appropriate end state goals and lack of ability to 
create synergy among peacebuilding actors. Respondent 2 reiterated inputs of 
respondent 1, and suggested that the lack of resources was informed by the approach 
adopted at the inception of the UNPBC. In addition, respondent 1 raised similar 
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concerns on lack or resources and peacebuilding knowledge base found within AU and 
the SADC REC institution. The ICGLR was identified by respondent 2, 5 as lacking in its 
capacity to perform due to its expanded and open ended mandate, lack of coordination 
and lack of ability to systematically attend to issues confronting the region and Burundi. 
Observations of respondents 1, 2, 5 correspond and support writings of Jenkins (2008), 
Moolakkattu (2010) and other authors identified earlier, on challenges bedevilling 
international peacebuilding institutions. Apart from financial, human and coordinating 
challenges in international institutions, it is further observed that open mandates and 
numerous obligations stretch the capacity to perform and place more demands on other 
resources 
In conclusion it is evident from the research that SA peacebuilding activities are not 
affected by a lack of Government financial resources as ARF has adequate resources. 
It would appear that the main challenge is found within SA implementers at lower levels 
where actors lack capacity due to lack of knowledge and understanding of the policy, its 
requirements and their mandate. It is also evident that implementers at lower levels of 
SA departments view their responsibility in a sectorial manner and therefore fail to link 
their activities to national and international dynamics and institutions. SA systems and 
planning also appear not to consider the characteristics of post conflict societies. Lastly 
it is noted that capacity challenges are found not only within SA, but also at the different 
peacebuilding institutions. 
 
 Context 4.3.2.3
 
Context in implementation, according to Brynard & de Coning (2006), focuses on 
understanding of the institutions in which the policy operates and travels. The focus 
provides insight on issues of support or lack of support from clients and coalitions. In 
chapter one, Hay & Winscott (1998) also identified that studying institutions provides 
insight on relationships between structure, agency and action therefore reveals issues 
of power, authority and influences within which implementation policy travels.  
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Issues of power in this research were indicated earlier in chapter one as relating to “the 
ability to make people (or things) do what they would not otherwise have done” and 
denotes forms of “force, persuasion … coercion and manipulation” (McLean, 1996, p. 
396). The power relations investigation is valuable in this variable as it reveals how 
coalitions, institutions, interests, and different actors impact on decision making 
processes, outcomes and output of the policy. The application of historical 
institutionalism assists the interpretation of data on revealing issues of conflict and 
process and how the uneven power relations affect the functions of different institutions 
(Leftwich, 2007; Hall & Taylor, 1996) e.g. executive and bureaucrats. 
Lastly, as indicated in chapter one, the adoption of the elite theory in the research 
provides for the possibility of decision making being influenced by one actor “across 
different issue areas” (Lukes, 1993, pp. 51-52). 
The data collected indicates an elitist approach in implementation of the policy and 
decision making in SA institutions. The elitist approach informs the adoption by SA 
institutions of the top down model of implementation, discussed by Paudel (2009) and 
illustrated in table 219 of the research. The data collected further reveals that this elitist, 
top down approach negatively affects policy outputs and finally minimum power levels of 
the SA executive actors at domestic and international peacebuilding institutions 
 
National institutions 
Decision making 
Chapter two discussed how Malan & Kent (2003, p. 3) and Anderson (1997, p. 64) 
identified Presidents as instrumental in driving and influencing foreign policy agendas. 
As observed in that chapter this common practice, by most countries, directly positions 
the executive at the centre of implementation of foreign relations activities. The 
discussion on SA actors also revealed that DIRCO as the lead department, in 
conjunction with other departments, has to ensure execution of the policy.  
The collected data reveals that SA decision making of the policy is concentrated in the 
executive and therefore suggests SA as being confined to the thinking of the first 
generation i.e. top down approach of policy implementation. It is further suggested that 
the approach and the perception of bureaucrats results in bureaucrats failing to 
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interrogate issues of linkages between activities, root causes and motives of 
intervention. These observations are informed by the following data. 
Respondents 4, 5, 6, 7 view their role as ensuring that instructions of the executive are 
fulfilled and on their not having any leeway of influencing direction on activities and 
decisions on peacebuilding. According to respondent 7, civilian activities are viewed by 
the executive as secondary to security sector activities and results in civilian 
departments being roped in as an afterthought by the executive. Advice of bureaucrats 
on implementation of the policy is, according to respondent 5, treated lightly by the 
executive with no indication of what and who informs decision making of the executive 
and, according to the respondent, this contributes to policy failure. 
SA’s ability to influence direction of PBC activities and its decision processes were 
unclear since most respondents lacked knowledge on that institution. It is however 
observed that the ability to coerce PBC actors in peacebuilding would be limited since 
SA does not play a direct role in the PBC (refer to diagram 2 above) and since the 
variable on coalition and clients identified SA’s weakness in mapping and formation of 
coalitions around implementation of the policy. 
 
Retention of authorities 
Respondents 2, 3, 6, 7 indicated that the exit of certain actors affected continuity in 
policy implementation. The critical actors identified were members of the executive and 
bureaucrats who left the system with institutional knowledge. The observations of the 
respondents indicate power as being endowed on individuals instead of governmental 
structures. Respondent 3 referred to this practise as political patronage in funding and 
decision making around peacebuilding activities. 
 
Funding 
Availability of funding for peacebuilding activities seemed to be an issue within some SA 
departments. Respondent 7 indicated the dilemma faced by other departments 
expected to implement DIRCO commitments and observed that departments end up 
planning for peace building activities without budgets. Inputs received from other 
respondents 3 4, 5, reveals that Government budget planning systems are not geared 
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towards funding of ad hoc peace mission projects as departments are expected to 
adhere to strict protocols of accounting and other requirements imposed by the 
Department of Finance and Treasury e.g. PFMA and budgeting cycle.  
It is observed that the inflexibility of SA accounting and budgeting systems affects 
implementation of the policy. To address this dilemma DIRCO established ARF yet 
despite respondent 8 indicating sufficiency of funds within ARF, other respondents 3, 5 
7 expressed frustration with sourcing that funding. Respondents 3, 5, 7 suggested that 
ARF accounting systems as being still heavily influenced by demands of Treasury 
instead of practicalities on the ground.  
Respondents 6, 8 appreciated the ARF systems, alluding to their usefulness as a tool 
for project management and prevention of fraud. The arguments of these respondents 
illustrate the need to balance demands of monitoring projects and accountability in the 
funding of projects at sometimes short notice (falling outside the three year budgeting 
cycle of government) in countries lacking in resources and systems. The arguments of 
6, 8 is further useful, especially when consideration is given to the source of the funds 
which includes external donors and SA taxpayers who all require DIRCO to account for 
use of ARF expenditure. 
Respondent 4 provided insight into another avenue of funding projects i.e. trilateral 
agreements concluded between a SA national department, Burundi Government and 
funding country. The benefits of this route are two-fold. It enables SA to access funding 
without the rigorous procedures of ARF and to also enable departments to form 
coalitions with other third party actors. However, the route does not address the 
challenge of accounting and satisfying SA requirements e.g. timelines and systems. In 
addition, the receiving department also faces new challenges of adherence to donor 
conditions on reporting and accounting. 
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International institutions 
Decision making 
In chapter one, Richmond (2011) and Ottaway (2007), on discussing liberal 
peacebuilding and prioritisation of activities, cautioned against the imposition of 
priorities on receiving countries. According to the data, the warnings of these authors 
seem to elude some intervening actors at the international level. The UN and PBC are 
used to illustrate this aspect. 
Respondent 2 suggested that, despite the Barundi people having expressed their 
preferences in the Arusha agreement in relation to the reconciliation path, UN actors 
placed demands informed by their own preferences. According to the respondent this 
practise has delayed implementation of key Arusha provisions. Respondent 1 also 
noted that the PBC, in its activities, seem to neglect paying particular regard to the 
context and characteristics of the receiving countries and instead focused on the priority 
of entrenching democracy. 
 
Funding 
Respondent 1 indicated that prioritisation of activities by intervening actors affected the 
funding of those activities consequently the PBC seems to focus on the “entrenchment 
of democracy” end state in its funding model. None of the respondents expressed a 
view on how funding dynamics of the AU and SADC impacted on SA and its choice of 
activities. It can however be observed that minimum levels of influence would be 
expected, in choice of activities for SA, since evidence including inputs from respondent 
8 suggested SA as not facing issues of financial capacity and would therefore not 
request funding from these institutions.  
 
Burundi  
Ball (1996) identified four common characteristics of post conflict societies. As 
discussed in chapter one, these relate to; weak public and civil society institutions, out 
dated or weak economic and social infrastructure, highly securitised state and a society 
operating in a context of isolation. The variable on capacity further delved into 
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challenges faced by SA actors in implementation in the presence of institutional 
weaknesses of Burundi. 
The challenges of Burundi were further exacerbated by the provision of the Arusha 
agreement which imposed certain obligations on the Government which were to be 
achieved through assistance of intervening actors. These relationships placed Burundi 
on the back-foot since even if its actors identified priorities of peacebuilding those could 
only be addressed if and when the external intervening actors provided the necessary 
resources. 
In Burundi, as in most post conflict societies, the policy therefore travels in a terrain of 
weak institutions, that lack resources and most probably has powerless actors. These 
factors could therefore provide insight on the unsustainability of SA projects after 
departure of SA actors. The observation therefore calls on SA actors to ensure that their 
planning and choice of activities pays particular focus on development and resourcing of 
Burundi institutions and according to observations of respondent 5, 7 SA seems to fall 
short in this regard as it focuses on security activities more than civilian ones. 
 
Retention of authorities 
Similarly to SA, implementation of the policy seems to also suffer from the exit of 
members of the executive and respondent 2 provided insight by stating that “Burundi 
cannot implement policies due to the high turnover of political heads which affect 
continuity”. 
In addition it would seem that the influence and power relations between SA and 
Burundi shifted in later years. Whilst SA was instrumental and a key actor during the 
Arusha process respondent 1 notes that in later years “projects and activities of other 
departments could not continue because SA’s presence in Burundi became unpopular 
after SA’s insistence on the inclusion of Paliphetu-FNL led by Agathon Rwasa 
movement in the peace agreement”. According to the respondent (1), “South African 
departments were then faced with a hostile environment”. Respondent 2 offered similar 
sentiments and suggested that at a certain point SA lost momentum in its Burundi 
peace mission. 
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In conclusion it would be noted that availability of resources plays a major role in 
influencing prioritisation of activities. The data suggests that intervening actors with 
resources use these as a tool to advance their interests and coerce or influence the 
direction of peacebuilding in recipient countries. In addition the data reveals that SA 
possesses limited influence on international peacebuilding institutions. Domestically it 
would also appear that whilst some actors (executive) possess the necessary authority 
their power is also limited and this results in limited outputs of the policy. 
 
 Commitment  4.3.2.4
 
Proponents of the bottom up model of implementation consider commitment as an 
important variable, noting that even the best policy, with an ideal bureaucratic structure 
fail “if those responsible for carrying it out are unwilling or unable to do so” (Brynard & 
de Coning, 2006, p. 198). In addition, Brynard & de Coning (2006) note the importance 
of investigations at different levels (regime, state, street and those in between) through 
which policy travels and that influences and linkages on commitment are informed by 
the other variables of the 5-C protocols.  
In the event of countries being unable to form coalitions, Cousens (2001, p. 188) in 
chapter two, suggests that actors can advance their peacebuilding objectives by taking 
action “within their own systems of Government” i.e. bilateral arrangements. The data 
collected indicates varying levels of commitment by different actors in pursuing this 
option. The greatest fault lines contributing to this unwillingness and/or inability to 
implement are mainly linked to the other variables of context, capacity, clients and 
coalition. Commitment levels of different actors are discussed below. 
 
Executive  
The SA executive has, through the policy adopted, an approach of comprehensive 
peace missions. The policy aims to ensure the creation of durable peace in world 
affairs. According to the policy, engagement of security and civilian peacebuilding 
measures are essential for successful implementation. The data however, indicates that 
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the SA executive has largely neglected co-option of the civilian component and adoption 
of long term measures for ensuring durable peace in its peace missions. Instead its 
approach seems more biased towards short term security initiatives. The observation is 
informed by the following responses discussed below. 
On the motives for SA participation, respondents 2, 5 identified requests of third parties 
as being focused on the amicable conclusion of hostilities. The respondents 2, 5 stated 
that the goal was achieved through the conclusion of the Arusha agreement, securing of 
returnees, protection of VIPs, and protection of SA (military) assets and provision of 
military training to the Burundi military forces. According to the two respondents, these 
were tangible outputs for measuring the success of SA’s participation in the peace 
mission. However, it is observed that the interpretation fails to consider SA commitment 
to long term approach of the peacebuilding policy. It casts a view of short term solutions 
of SA peace missions.  
On the inclusion of civilians in peacebuilding activities, respondent 7 observed that 
civilian departments played a secondary role to the security sector. The observation of 
the respondent is supported by evidence gathered in terms of SA activities (indicated in 
the previous paragraph). However it should be noted that SA did also undertake some 
civilian peacebuilding activities and it is observed that these were insufficient and could 
not have contributed significantly to the creation of durable peace. 
The data indicates that immediately after the peace talks, SA undertook activities 
directed at creating capacity building on evaluation of land, gender and ethnic issues, 
reconciliation and conflict management. However, responses also revealed that apart 
from the 2008 civil service capacity building project, others terminated during the 
infancy of the intervention. Secondly, respondent 5 indicated that DIRCO commissioned 
national departments to undertake research assessments in Burundi and that despite 
compilation of reports, the process terminated without implementation. Thirdly, 
respondent 7 observed that whilst DIRCO “dictates” to other departmental 
projects/programs on international relations, it neglects to allocate funding for those 
projects. Fourthly, the oversight by some executive members of other national 
departments to timeously conclude sectorial MOU’s after DIRCO’s commitment to the 
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general agreement of 2007, indicates lack of commitment and capacity by other 
members of the executive.  
Respondents 1, 2, 5 also indicated that DIRCO’s numerous commitments, in various 
arenas, contribute in informing questions of ability to perform. As a consequence of 
these numerous obligations respondent 2 noted that “capacity of DIRCO is limited and 
given this adherence to commitment is always going to be a challenge”. The assertion 
of respondent 2 provides insight on how the commitment is closely linked to the variable 
of capacity. It is therefore evident that DIRCO’s lack of commitment is heavily influenced 
by the dependency relationship between DIRCO and other national departments for 
implementation of the policy. 
Barundi executive actors were also challenged by respondents 4, 5, 7 for lacking in 
commitment as they failed to sustain peacebuilding activities after the departure of SA 
actors. Respondent 6 even went further and suggested that this was proof that whilst 
SA actors were committed, actors of recipient countries were not. It is however 
suggested that the weakness lay with SA actors in failing to introduce a sustainable 
peacebuilding approach in receiving countries and failing to develop local capacity that 
would ensure sustainability of activities. In this regard, SA would be viewed as having 
fallen short of the demands of the policy. 
 
Bureaucrats 
It is suggested that lack of policy content informed the reduced commitment of 
bureaucrats as they could not link their mandate to the policy. This observation is 
informed by the following data. 
Respondents 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 generally indicated an understanding of SA foreign relations 
policy and its possible application in the Burundi intervention. Respondent 4 did not 
consider SA foreign relations policy despite being an international relations manager of 
a national department. Instead the respondent linked and confined the departments’ 
activities to AU strategies. The responses of the majority provide insight on the inability 
of bureaucratic actors to implement the policy as they lacked understanding on issues 
of content of the peace mission. 
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The bureaucrats 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 also indicated several actions that demotivated them and 
which challenged their commitment and made them to question the commitment of 
recipient actors. The issues related to the unsustainability of projects on the departure 
of SA actors, lack of control and corruption system by recipient countries. 
 
International institutions 
Despite the existence of international peacebuilding institutions and the strides 
undertaken by the UN in producing debate and frameworks for peacebuilding it is 
suggested that commitment to comprehensive peacebuilding by international institutions 
needs to be improved. The conclusion is drawn from inputs from respondents 1, 2, 5. 
Respondent 5 indicated that UN systems were not “result orientated”. The respondent 
cited three examples to support this. Firstly observing that UN actors and their 
coordination in field operations hampered actual performance. Secondly the system of 
producing numerous resolutions on each item confused issues. Lastly the respondent 
noted how durable peace in Burundi could only be achieved through attendance of 
conflict issues in neighbouring countries and noted the failure of the UN and ICGLR in 
assisting with this. 
Respondent 1 questioned the prioritisation of the end state of entrenchment of 
democracy by the UN. Respondent 2 questioned the role of the UN in the 
implementation of Arusha agreement and brought into focus the issue of the UN 
imposing its own issues on the reconciliation and demand for a UN tribunal contrary to 
the wishes of the Barundi preferences. Finally respondent 5 introduced the issue of the 
ICGLR. The respondent noted how the ICGLR wide mandate resulted in lack of focus 
on issues of peacebuilding.  
Finally respondent 2 was highly critical on the funding model of the UNPBC. It is 
observed that this lack of resources within the UNPBC reflects issues of lack 
commitment to peacebuilding by international actors within the UN system. 
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 Content  4.3.2.5
 
According to Brynard & de Coning (2006, pp. 196-97), policy content provides insight on 
the means and measures adopted to achieve policy objectives. Chapter two provided 
insight on SA’s approach to comprehensive peace missions. Considerations of the 
policy approach and different literature review consequently informed the definition of 
peacebuilding as being “long term post conflict activities and tools jointly adopted by 
local and intervening actors to ensure the existence of sustainable peace”20. The 
definition informed the research that meeting the objective of durable peace entailed 
involvement of different actors, over long periods who would in concert undertake 
certain activities.  
Despite highlighting some weaknesses of content, observations of respondents 1, 2, 6 
are pertinent as they provide insight on the importance of the policy, the context of its 
drafting (after democratization of SA) and its pronouncements on issues of mandate 
and approach to peacebuilding. It is therefore suggested that whilst the policy remains 
relevant reforms of content could improve its implementation. 
The content discussion in this research uses data received on activities and the gaining 
of access by SA civilian actors to international institutions to understand issues of the 
“measures and means” adopted implement the policy. 
 
Civilian access to peacebuilding institutions 
As indicated in chapter two, SA provided for a readiness system (resource bank) in the 
policy for registering, controlling and deploying expert civilians in peace missions. 
Chapter two also drew attention to concerns raised in the policy on implementation of 
this provision. The concerns addressed issues of voluntarism of deployment for 
civilians, levels of SA influence on ensuring placement of its civilians in other 
organisations and the dependency on commitment or “enthusiasm” of DIRCO officials 
and “efficacy of the civilian readiness arrangement” (p. 31).  
The data collected indicate that whilst aware of these challenges during drafting of the 
policy, there is no indication that SA actors sought to address them. As a result SA fell 
short of meeting the commitment and objective of placing its civilian experts in 
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institutions involved in peacebuilding. It is argued that lack of knowledge (capacity) and 
impracticality of the provision led to its non-implementation. Data supporting this 
argument is gained from all respondents as they were unaware of the provision. Lack of 
knowledge on the provision meant that respondents could not, and as evidence suggest 
did not, systematically engage in implementing the provision. 
Despite the hindrance of knowledge, respondents 1 3, 4, 5, 6 expressed opinions on the 
provision, based on their own personal experiences. Only respondent 3 supported 
inclusion of the provision. Respondents 1, 4, 5, 6, expressed reservations about 
practicability of the provision. The reservations relate to; how other institutions had 
failed to implement the provisions, challenges of management and capacity challenges 
found in SA actors. It is therefore observed that the retention of the provision in the 
policy is self-defeating for DIRCO since it contributes to implementation failure and that 
DIRCO should instead find alternatives of ensuring placement of SA actors in 
peacebuilding activities e.g. bilateral engagements. 
 
Activities: planning, nature and duration 
The policy intends using peacebuilding activities to address root causes of conflicts for 
the creation of durable peace. Data however reveals that the activities were not 
strategically planned, directed and coordinated to ensuring the creation of durable 
peace. Instead the data reveals SA actors as functioning in a sectorial manner and not 
linking their own foreign relations activities to the policy, general government programs 
and other departments. This is despite observations of literature found in chapter one 
where Greener (2011), Cousens (2001) and Serwer & Thomson (2007) argued for the 
importance of actors being guided by a common framework of activities which are 
informed by a hierarchy of priorities. The priorities and framework, according to the 
authors, are informed by end states and objectives of the intervening actors. The 
methodology according to the authors assists actors with the establishment of common 
goals and benchmarks, identification of areas of intervention, coordination of activities, 
resource allocation and sharing, monitoring and evaluation. The data collected indicates 
that SA failed to consider this and if the executive did consider them failed to inform 
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actors at the lower level (bureaucrats). Evidence for this is glimpsed from the following 
data. 
SA bureaucratic actors did not link activities to implementation of the policy and 
consequently respondents 6, 7, 8 had no direct knowledge of Burundi peacebuilding 
activities. The other five respondents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, identified activities undertaken by SA 
actors. Respondents 1, 2, 5, provided inputs on activities beyond their own sector and 
provided specific inputs on the objective of the Burundi peace mission. There is no 
evidence of the respondents having knowledge either on SA’s framework or of its 
priority plan, nor those of the Burundi government.  
Despite the above discussion SA actors undertook peacebuilding activities in Burundi. 
The activities undertaken were identified in areas of; training of civil servants, training on 
land issues, evaluation mechanisms to monitor ethnic and gender dynamics, training on 
negotiation and reconciliation skills, assisting in social cohesion and reduction of 
poverty. It is acknowledged that these were appropriately directed towards addressing 
the root causes of the conflict, as identified by Daley (2007) and the Arusha agreement. 
However, durable peace could only be achieved if SA activities were strategically 
implemented.  
Strategic execution of the activities would have entailed what Cousens (2001, pp. 12-
14) labelled as “exit strategies” or “reduced commitment strategies” which permit “self-
enforcement … over time without new international intervention” and therefore enables 
local institutions to manage conflict without resorting to violence. On the same note Ali & 
Matthews (2004, p. 14) provided insight on how intervening actors should focus on 
“helping local actors establish the conditions that will enable them to make choices in an 
atmosphere free of large-scale violence, fear, deprivation, and privation”, the ideas of 
these authors was discussed in chapter one. Influences on achieving these objectives 
are found in the duration and nature of activities. 
The variable of commitment briefly discussed the duration of the activities. It is evident 
that apart from the training of civil servants activity (five years, having resumed in 2008), 
the other activities seem to have either not commenced or only lasted for short periods 
e.g. the DIRCO driven departmental assessment reports did not lead to any activities 
and other activities were undertaken for periods of less than five years.  
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Reasons for termination provide further insight on how coalitions and clients, capacity 
and commitment affect implementation of DIRCO policies. Respondent 1 indicated that 
political hostilities within Burundi actors towards SA led to termination of activities. 
Respondents 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 identified political preferences as influencing continuity of 
activities and all respondents identified lack of coordination as a factor. 
As discussed previously in chapter one too, long term peacebuilding measures are not 
only informed by duration of years but impact of activity e.g. sustainability of the 
peacebuilding activities and development of capacity of local actors who would then 
continue with the activities in the absence of intervening actors. The data as discussed 
previously indicated the opposite with respondents indicating how SA activities 
crumbled after departure of SA actors. It is therefore argued that SA activities fell short 
of the demands of building capacity to ensure durable peace as advocated by Ali & 
Matthews (2004) and Cousens (2001). 
 
 Conclusion 4.3.3
The data and its interpretation reveal major weaknesses in all five areas of the 5-C 
protocols. The investigation also provides an opportunity for reforms that could improve 
implementation of the policy. It is therefore envisaged that the knowledge generated by 
this exercise will contribute to the newly established Governmental institutions of 
DIRCO and the Department of Public Service (DPSA) which include the SA 
Development Partnership Agency (SADPA)21 and the School of Governance for civil 
servants. The summary of the conclusion and suggested reforms are detailed in chapter 
five. 
 
 
 
 
.   
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 Chapter 5 Conclusion and Recommendations 5
 
 Introduction 5.1
 
The research aims were to provide knowledge and meaning to policy makers and actors 
in the field of peace and security on issues of peacebuilding. In addition, the research 
investigates and provides recommendations on reforms on existing peacebuilding 
institutions, the policy and its implementation. 
The policy provides for a comprehensive approach to peace missions and recognises 
peacebuilding and participation of civilian actors as essential elements in peacebuilding. 
However, research indicated a research gap on policy implementation and lack of 
sufficient focus on civilian peacebuilding activities. 
The research was premised on the proposition that peacebuilding institutions negatively 
affect outputs of civilian peacebuilding activities and the attainment of SA objectives of 
comprehensive peace missions as envisaged by the white paper on South African 
participation in international peace missions. To prove or disprove the proposition the 
research focused on a primary and three supplementary research questions. 
The primary research question was; did SA implement the civilian peacebuilding 
objectives of the “White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace 
Missions” (the policy) in the Burundi peace mission during the period of 2000-2008? 
Supplementary questions addressed how did civilian activities, by SA intervening 
actors, address the root causes of the conflict, how did the peacebuilding institutions 
facilitate or impede the participation of civilians in peacebuilding, and finally what, if any, 
are the suggested reforms? 
Exploratory and descriptive research was undertaken and a qualitative research design 
was adopted. The Burundi case study during the period of 2000-2008 was utilised to 
provide specific and general observations on implementation of the policy. 
The current chapter links the findings to the research questions and utilises the 5-C 
protocols to provide a summary of findings and suggest possible reforms. 
The researcher is of the opinion that the policy is an informative tool and provides a 
necessary framework for actors involved in SA peace missions. The research however 
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indicates the existence of weaknesses in its implementation. It is suggested that as SA 
advances towards its 20 years of democracy and as DIRCO and other government 
stakeholders review their policies, the reforms suggested in this research could 
contribute to providing knowledge to policymakers to improve on the weaknesses 
identified. 
 
 Summary of findings 5.2
 
The findings of the research confirm the proposition that peacebuilding institutions 
negatively affect outputs of civilian peacebuilding activities and the attainment of SA 
objectives of comprehensive peace missions as envisaged by the white paper on South 
African participation in international peace missions. The findings of the research 
indicate that SA did not sufficiently implement its civilian peacebuilding policy in the 
Burundi mission during the period of 2008-2008. These findings are informed by the 
observation that SA activities did not address the horizontal inequalities of Burundi as 
discussed in chapter 3 and advocated by Stewart & Brown (2007). Secondly, the 
research indicates that peacebuilding institutions impede implementation of the policy 
due to issues of content, context, coalition and clients, commitment and capacity 
discussed below.  
 
Clients and coalitions  
The findings indicate that SA actors fail to systematically identify and form coalitions of 
the willing as required by the policy. The findings indicate the existence of this 
weakness at both domestic and international level.  
Domestically, the executive at the level of Presidency and DIRCO drive implementation 
of the policy without co-opting other levels of Government deemed instrumental for 
successful implementation i.e. other members of the executive and bureaucrats. The 
executive, generally, neglect to systematically co-opt civil society actors in 
implementation of its peacebuilding policy. In the event of co-option, termination of 
coalitions was informed by issues of political choices.  
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The findings also indicate that SA’s top down model of implementation of the policy 
alienates bureaucrats. Consequently bureaucrats confine their mandate to delivering 
instructions determined by political heads and therefore neglect to map and analyse 
motives and interests of other intervening actors.  
Limited knowledge of the policy, by SA’s bureaucrats, significantly contributes to 
weaknesses of implementation since bureaucrats do not understand the value of 
mapping and analysis of different institutions and actors found within those institutions. 
The findings indicate that the bureaucrats, due to lack of knowledge, could not have 
formed coalitions with other actors found in international institutions as they indicated 
lack of knowledge of these institutions and their mandate. 
Finally, the data collected did not indicate that the executive and other SA actors 
leveraged on their role of facilitators of the Arusha agreement. The oversight meant that 
SA did not use its power to influence the direction of peacebuilding activities of other 
intervening actors. The finding suggests that SA actors do not apply the rational choice 
institutionalism in their decision making and fail to use institutions to “capture gains from 
cooperation” identified by Leftwich (2007), and discussed in chapter one. 
 
Capacity 
The research revealed the availability of financial resources, within SA, for 
implementation of peacebuilding activities. However, capacity weaknesses which 
hamper implementation of the policy were found in domains of structures, actors and 
systems. 
SA peacebuilding structures exhibited signs of weak leadership, coordination, and 
knowledge base. Leadership was not exhibited by the SA executive and this resulted in 
failure to co-opt and mobilize other actors around proper implementation of the policy. 
The SA structure charged with coordination of peace missions was identified as weak 
and unable to carry out its function. In some instances the different structures of 
Government were unable to feed and process information to and between each other 
e.g. ARF, NOCPM and different national departments and there was no central data 
base for knowledge management of SA peacebuilding activities. International 
structures, charged with implementation of peacebuilding exhibited signs of lack of 
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resources (human, financial), wide mandates and different actor interests. Due to this, 
they could not perform their mandate within stipulated deadlines e.g. extension of 
BINUB timeframes and failure to implement the Arusha reconciliation provisions. 
Bureaucratic lack of knowledge negatively affected their capacity in linking issues of 
mandate, and prioritisation of end state activities as determined by recipient country 
needs and SA’s strategic focus. 
Systems and planning of SA Government revealed themselves not to being aligned to 
realities on the ground e.g. accounting and reporting systems hampered by lack of 
capacity (human and infrastructure) found in recipient countries.  
 
Context 
The findings support the view that domestically the executive exercises power and 
authority on implementation of the policy. The exercise of power by the executive 
revealed itself to be hierarchical and elitist.  
The arrangement reflects a power structure where the President is at the apex and first 
level. DIRCO is positioned at the second level and then other national departments. 
Bureaucrats and civil society actors are at the bottom of the hierarchy. The authorities at 
the higher levels are perceived as directing and influencing implementation of the policy 
at all levels domestically. However their power is in actual effect limited, since, apart 
from pronouncements and internal decision making their reliance on disempowered 
bureaucrats for implementation reduces outputs of the policy. The arrangement 
therefore negatively affects implementation.  
Similarly, SA’s ability to influence direction of PBC activities and other international 
actors at the multilateral level is viewed as also minimal, since SA is not a key actor in 
those structures. It is also evident that SA actors neglect to sufficiently take advantage 
and influence action on peacebuilding through forming strategic coalitions with other 
external institutions also negatively affects output of the policy. 
The availability of financial resources from actors/donors appears to be critical in 
influencing and directing prioritisation of activities undertaken in peacebuilding. 
Consequently, implementation of national peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks and 
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Priority Plans of recipient countries seem dependent on the choices of the financially 
viable countries and their interests. 
Finally, it is evident that intervening actors have to take into account the characteristics 
of post conflict societies for sustainability of their activities. In SA’s instance the collapse 
of activities after departure suggests SA’s lack of appreciation of context issues e.g. 
capacity challenge from both countries, hostility from recipient actors, and lack of follow 
through on undertakings. In conclusion, similar to SA, the exit of Burundi bureaucrats 
and executive negatively influence the continuity of activities.  
 
Commitment  
The variable of commitment confines itself to unwillingness or inability to perform. With 
regard to SA executive, the actors demonstrated a propensity towards short term 
security measures instead of long term civilian activities. This indicates an unwillingness 
of commitment to the creation of durable peace through employment of civilian 
activities. Limitation of DIRCO and the President to co-opt other members of the 
executive and bureaucrats reveals issues of inability. 
It is also evident that SA’s incapacity to identify and form coalitions affected its 
commitment. The arrangement calls into question DIRCO’s commitment in assisting 
other departments in implementation of the policy. An example is that of DIRCO not 
funding or directing funding to other departments for civilian activities, despite the 
presence of sufficient funds of ARF. The unwillingness to assist resulted in one 
department forming a trilateral agreement with a third actor and placing an extra burden 
of accountability on that department. 
The lack of knowledge and content of the policy reduced SA bureaucrats’ capacity and 
their level of commitment. Demotivation and alienation from decision making processes 
contributed to their unwillingness and inability to implement. 
The Barundi actors, on the other hand, reveal elements of inability to implement which 
are informed by the lack of capacity variable. The same capacity variable also 
influenced the inability of international institutions and its actors e.g. lack of resources 
from PBC, AU and SADC and the open ended mandate of the ICGLR. 
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Content 
SA intended to place civilian experts in peacebuilding institutions. The resource bank 
avenue was the adopted tool for this objective. Data indicates that despite its existence, 
the tool was never established and therefore never utilised. 
Secondly, the policy identified its objective of attendance to root causes of conflict. The 
tools adopted for this was use of actors and activities. The data reveals that lack of 
knowledge, proper planning, and coordination by actors resulted in government 
activities being short term with some terminating without contribution to the goal of 
creation of durable peace.  
 
 Recommendation 5.3
 
Clients and coalitions  
To attend to issues of clients and coalitions, the Presidency and DIRCO should 
systematically adopt steps that will result in the co-option of like-minded actors (coalition 
of the willing) in the implementation of the policy. This can be achieved through firstly 
ensuring knowledge of the comprehensive approach of peace missions and the policy is 
enhanced at all levels (building capacity within SA actors). Secondly introduction of the 
exercise of mapping and analysing institutions and actors should form part of SA’s risk 
assessment and be a standing requirement for planning and approval for each 
peacebuilding activity. Periodic reviews and reporting on activities must also include 
mapping of actors as a standing item. Thirdly SA should encourage the formation of 
coalitions with actors at different levels including civil society. Lastly decision making 
and implementation model should be based on a hybrid model as inputs of bureaucrats 
should also influence the decision making process instead of the current practice of top 
down implementation. 
 
Capacity 
Capacity weaknesses can be attended to by firstly ensuring that peace mission 
activities of SA intervening actors are centralised and streamlined to ensure successful 
coordination and this includes the establishment of a nodal data base for all peace 
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mission activities. Secondly bureaucrats should build knowledge and acquaint 
themselves with tools of implementation. Thirdly risk assessment, planning, institutions, 
activities and systems should be informed by Ball’s characteristics of post conflict 
societies. Fourthly SA should mobilise other international peacebuilding institutions 
(PBC, AU and SADC) to attend to their capacity building challenges. Fifthly capacity 
building training for SA policy makers and implementers should be undertaken so as to 
improve levels of policy management issues. Lastly SA should prioritise capacity 
building activities in areas of project management and governance for recipient 
countries. 
 
Context 
Weaknesses of context can be addressed by ensuring that SA in collaboration with local 
actors focuses on institutional capacity building in recipient countries. SA must also 
develop coalitions with key strategic members of peacebuilding institutions e.g. PBC. 
 
Commitment  
The researcher is of the opinion that attendance to issues of commitment could be 
addressed by the building of capacity of knowledge within SA actors and those of the 
recipient countries. Secondly the decision making role of SA bureaucrats should be 
elevated. Thirdly capacity building and resourcing of UN, AU ICGLR, and SADC 
peacebuilding institutions should be improved in order to enable the general 
implementation of peacebuilding activities e.g. SA could identify and form appropriate 
coalitions that could assist SA implement its own policy. Lastly DIRCO should acquire 
funds and manage them on behalf of other departments so as to streamline funding of 
peacebuilding activities instead of departments entering trilateral agreements with third 
party countries outside the control of DIRCO. It is recommended that once operational, 
SADPA should be configured in a manner that would best follow this model. 
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Content 
Finally on content SA should instead of focusing on placing civilians within international 
peacebuilding, strengthen its approach to achieving peacebuilding objectives through 
the formation of coalitions and bilateral agreements with receiving countries. In addition 
SA should in each peacebuilding activity develop its own framework and priority plan 
which is linked to that of the recipient country and all SA actors should undertake 
activities informed by the plan. The adoption of this strategy would assist with 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.  
 
 Future research  5.4
 
The recommendations indicate a need for SA to establish a hybrid model of 
implementation in its decision making process for peacebuilding missions. Secondly 
there is also indication of the need to centralize some functions including those of; 
developing of risk assessment tools for peacebuilding, building of knowledge within SA 
actors on the policy and establishment of a common evaluation tool on implementation 
of the policy. It is the opinion of the researcher that further investigation on these 
matters would greatly enhance implementation of the policy and could also add value to 
implementation of other DIRCO policies.  
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Annexure 1: List of agreements signed between RSA and Burundi as on 30 July 2013 
(source: DIRCO) 
 
Date 
signed 
Title Date of entry 
into force 
1992/02/06 Bilateral Air Transport Agreement. 
 
 
1992/2/06 
 
1995/06/23 Exchange of Notes between the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Burundi on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
1995/06/23 
2001/10/26 
 
Memorandum of Understanding concerning the South African 
Mission in Support of the Implementation of the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. 
2001/10/26 
 
2004/05/05 
 
Memorandum of Understanding contributing resources to the African 
Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). 
2004/05/05 
 
2007/02/14 
 
General Co-operation Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of 
Burundi 
2007/02/14 
 
2008/09/16 
 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and the Government of the Republic of Burundi on Cooperation in the 
Field of Health Matters 
2008/09/16 
 
2011/08/11 
 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and the Government of the Republic of Burundi on Bilateral Co-
operation in the Agriculture and Livestock Sectors 
2011/08/11 
 
2011/08/11 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and the Government of the Republic of Burundi on Bilateral Co-
operation in the fields of Sports and Recreation 
 
2011/08/11 
2011/08/11 
 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and the Government of the Republic of Burundi on Defence 
Cooperation 
 
2011/08/11 
 
2011/08/11 
 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and the Government of the Republic of Burundi on Education 
Cooperation 
2011/08/11 
 
2011/08/11 
 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of 
Burundi regarding Economic Cooperation 
2011/08/11 
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Annexure 2: Officials questions 
 
Date & 
venue 
Name of interviewee Organization Position Duration Numb of 
interview 
     
 
First 
second 
1. Peace building and addressing of root causes 
a. What in your opinion were the root causes of the 1993 conflict? 
2. Peace building objectives and motive 
a. According to your understanding, what was the motive for South Africa’s participation 
in the peace building activities of Burundi? 
b. What were the objectives of the intervention? 
c. Were the objectives achieved? 
3. Peace building activities in Burundi 
a. According to your knowledge what were the activities undertaken to address 
institutional building of Burundi directly by your department? 
b. Did the activities address the root causes? If yes indicate how? 
c. Did the activities address the motives? If yes indicate how? 
4. Peace building and institutional arrangements 
a. What are the strengths of the current institutional arrangements 
b. What are the weaknesses in the current institutional arrangements 
c. What reforms would you like to see in the current institutional arrangement? 
5. Resource bank 
a. Did you place anybody through the mechanisms of the DIRCO resource bank? 
b. If so, what were the challenges faced? 
c. If not, why did you not utilize the system? 
6. Policy framework (5-C protocol) 
What are your observations on the following issues – motivate and support answers with 
examples (should have been addressed during the discussion of above questions.) 
a. The content of the policy?  
b. Institutional context?  
c. The capacity of implementers?  
d. The commitment of implementers? 
e. The support and non-support of the clients and other coalitions? 
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Annexure3: Questions for security experts. 
 
Date & 
venue 
Name of 
interviewee 
Organization Position Duration Numb of 
interview 
 
 
1 Peace building and addressing of root causes 
a. Did SA understand the root causes of the 1993 conflict? 
3. Peace building objectives  
a. According to your understanding, what was the motive for South Africa’s participation 
in the peace building activities of Burundi? 
b. What were the objectives of the intervention? 
c. Were the objectives achieved? 
4. Peace building activities in Burundi (linked to a above) 
a. According to your knowledge what were the activities undertaken to address 
institutional building of Burundi?  
b. Did the activities address the root causes? If yes indicate how? 
c. Did the activities address the motives? If yes indicate how? 
5. Peace building and institutional arrangements 
a. What are the strengths of the current institutional arrangements – locally and 
internationally? 
b. What are the weaknesses in the current institutional arrangements 
c. What reforms would you like to see in the current institutional arrangement? 
6. Resource bank 
a. Have you heard of the DIRCO resource bank? 
b. Is it implementable  
7. Policy framework (5-C protocol) – should have been addressed during the discussion of 
above questions.  
a. The content of the policy? 
b. Institutional context?  
c. The capacity of implementers?  
d. The commitment of implementers? 
e. The support and non-support of the clients and other coalitions? 
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Annexure 4: Respondents 
 
Date of interview  Number 
14 May 2013 1  
05 April 2013  2  
22 April 2013  3 
11 April 2013  4 
16 April 2013  5 
30 April 2013  6 
01 August 2013 7 
25 July 2013  8 
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1
 The White Paper was concluded by the Department of Foreign Affairs which was later renamed by the 
SA Government as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in 2009. 
2
 Included in the list are the United States, “Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Denmark, 
Norway, and Canada who have designated advisers or established units to coordinate some aspects of 
civilian operations in societies emerging from conflict” (Serwer & Thomson, 2007, p. 370). 
3
 The Arusha Agreement was signed by 19 primary actors with an interest in the Burundi conflict. Further 
discussion of the agreement is addressed in chapter 3, particularly in the sections on historical context of 
Burundi and peace agreements. 
4
 See Zandamela (2012, p. 64) for further elaboration of this approach. 
5
 Researcher was employed by the department of defence secretariat during the period of 1996 to 2006 
and was personally involved in the peace support operations environment during the period of 2000 to 
2006. 
6
 Leftwich (2007) draws a distinction in his analysis of organizations and institutions and thus informs the 
debate that the two cannot be synonymous. 
7 Paragraph 2.2 in the next chapter draws attention to the viewpoint of the policy and states “the policy 
does not confine peacebuilding to certain stages of the conflict but states that it is important in the 
different phases of the conflict and especially in post conflict phases where it involves 
diplomatic/developmental efforts (1999, p. 8)”. 
8
 Greener (2011) and Cousens (2001) allude to how liberal peacebuilding dominates the space. 
9
 Article 3(b), (c), 6 and 7. 
10
 NEPAD brings public private sector partnership and investment through the NEPAD business group 
and other Africans in the diaspora (Murithi, 2005, pp. 133-134). 
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11 The 31 member organisational committee is composed of 5 categories of “stakeholder” interests i.e. 
members of the Security Council (7 seats – 2 rotational and 5 permanent), Troop Contributing Countries 
(5 seats drawn from top ten troop contributing countries), Donor countries (5 seats from top 10 countries 
which voluntarily financially contribute to UN peace operations), ECOSOC (7 seats) and General 
Assembly (7 seats). The PBSO, located within the UN secretariat provides administrative, analysis and 
liaison function with other UN structures. The PBF accesses and distributes funding for peacebuilding 
efforts. 
12
 BINUB was established in 2006 through resolutions 1719 (UN, 2006) and 7191 (UN, 2007) for a term of 
two years 2007-2008. 
13
 The figures (ACCORD, 2007; Ameir, 2008; Boshoff, 2010) vary from author to author but the point 
illustrated is the high cost to human life and intensity of the conflict. 
14
 Others are wars of; “proxy”, “regional independence or autonomy”, “military interventions”, 
“revolutionary”, “political coalitions”. 
15
 Presidents Mandela, Museveni, Arap Moi, Mkapa; secretary generals of the UN and OAU, 
representative of the EU and Executive Director of the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation. 
16
 Article 11, chapter 11 of protocol IV states that “The transitional Government shall initiate and finance, 
with the support of the international community a programme of physical and political reconstruction …”. 
Article 17 then lists the actors that could provide resources for to an inter-ministerial reconstruction and 
development unit. 
17
 As detailed in the section dealing with Mwanza & Arusha. 
18
 The respondent did however note that the current director seems to possess those qualities and this 
might bode well for the institution. 
19 Table 2 adopted from Paudel (2009, p. 40) is found at the end of paragraph 1.3.3.2 
20
 Chapter 1 on conceptualisation.  
 
21
 Brief background on SADPA is found in chapter 2 in the ARF section. 
